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ThE Niesig and nLRa UniOn
 Currently, few cases actually proceed to trial, despite the reality that more 
complaints are filed than ever before.1 The catch is that many cases are tried in 
discovery.2 attorneys use various methods of formal discovery to strengthen their 
cases while weakening their opponents. They may even use discovery motions to 
create the appearance of winning in an effort to increase leverage. Because attorneys 
are skilled in evaluating evidence, at the close of discovery, they can often effectively 
calculate the probable outcome of a trial. The perceived winner of discovery might 
either leverage a greater settlement or successfully move for summary judgment. In 
such a litigation climate, methods of informal discovery take on ever greater 
significance.
 Ex parte interviews are a particularly effective method of informal discovery, in 
actions against entities especially, not least because they comport well with state and 
federal policies of liberal discovery.3 an ex parte interview is where an attorney 
questions an individual outside the presence of opposing counsel. Such interviews 
help streamline the collection of the facts.4 Witnesses are more likely to be less 
guarded and provide relevant information at informal interviews than at formal 
depositions.5 In such a setting, attorneys are better able to discern which witnesses 
have relevant information to their theory, a streamlining with cost-cutting benefit.6 
Ex parte interviews also help level the playing field, which is especially valuable in 
1. See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 Stan. L. rev. 1255, 
1255 (2005).
2. James W. McElhaney, Discovery is the Trial: Use Depositions as if They’re the Only Chance You’ ll Have to 
Try the Case, 93 a.B.a. 26, 26 (2007) (“In more than 90 percent of all cases filed in the United States, 
discovery is the only trial anybody gets.”).
3. See Fed. r. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) and n.Y. C.P.L.r. 3101 (McKinney 2009); Spectrum Sys. Int’l. Corp. v. 
Chemical Bank, 78 n.Y.2d 371, 376 (1991) (section 3101 “embodies the policy determination that 
liberal discovery encourages fair and effective resolution of disputes on the merits.”); Doe v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 99 F.r.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983) (Federal rules of Civil Procedure “have never been thought to 
preclude the use of such venerable, if informal, discovery techniques as the ex parte interview.”).
4. In Niesig v. Team I, 76 n.Y.2d 363, 377 (1990), Judge Bellacosa stated, “[d]iscovery of the truth and 
relevant proofs is the end to which litigation is the means. The fewer the parties to whom counsel can 
informally turn in the quest for facts on behalf of a client’s cause, the more cumbersome becomes the 
realization of this goal.” 
5. See Stephen Sinaiko, Ex Parte Communication and The Corporate Adversary: A New Approach, 66 n.Y.U. 
L. rev. 1456, 1477–79 (1991) (“[F]ormal discovery is not an ideal—or even adequate—substitute for the 
informal interview.”); G-1 Holdings v. Baron & Budd, 199 F.r.D. 529, 533 (S.D.n.Y. 2001) (“Indeed, 
ex parte interviews with such persons have been recognized as having an important role in information 
gathering in that former employees ‘often have emotional or economic ties to their former employer and 
would sometimes be reluctant to come forward with potentially damaging information if they could 
only do so in the present of the corporations attorney.’”) (quoting Polycast Tech. Corp.v. Uniroyal, Inc., 
129 F.r.D. 621, 628 (S.D.n.Y. 1990)); Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 
1975) (“[I]nterviews in the presence of opposing counsel did not lend themselves to the free and open 
discussion which IBM sought.”).
6. Int’ l Bus. Mach. Corps.,526 F.2d at 41 (“a lawyer talks to a witness to ascertain what, if any, information 
the witness may have relevant to his theory of the case.”).
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employment and civil rights cases.7 Entities, whether commercial or governmental, 
normally have greater evidentiary advantages than individual plaintiffs because they 
have immediate access to documents and employee-witnesses, while plaintiffs 
typically lack such resources.8 Finally, ex parte interviews promote the ideals of justice 
because costly depositions may actually deter plaintiffs with limited means from 
pursing legal remedies.9
 However, new York Professional Code of Conduct rule 4.2 (rule 4.2), which had 
previously been Disciplinary rule 7-104 prior to 2009 and is in informally known as the 
“no-contact rule,” curtails ex parte interviews by prohibiting an attorney from 
communicating with a “party” who is represented by counsel.10 The rule is easily applied 
when a party is a person, but because entities operate through employees, it is unclear 
which employees constitute the “party.” For decades the new York State courts never 
addressed the problem of when an employee is a “party,” and the new York bar associations 
that took aim at it devised an array of conflicting tests. Finally, in 1990, the new York 
Court of appeals seemingly resolved the issue in Niesig v. Team I by promulgating a 
three-prong “alter-ego test.”11 Under this test, a party includes “corporate employees 
whose acts or omissions in the matter under inquiry are binding on the corporation (in 
effect, the corporation’s ‘alter egos’) or imputed to the corporation for purposes of its 
liability, or employees implementing the advice of counsel.”12 Since then, both courts and 
commentators have primarily addressed whether or not low-level and former employees 
should be considered parties under the test, typically concluding that they are not.13
7. Kaveney v. Murphy, 97 F.Supp.2d 88, 94 (D. Mass. 2000) (“Employment cases, especially discrimination 
claims, present the most compelling case for court authorization of ex parte contact between the 
plaintiff ’s counsel and the defendant’s employees.”).
8. See e.g., Siguel v. Trs. of Tufts College, no. 88-0626-Y, 1990 WL 29199, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 1990) 
(“[Defendant] controls access to nearly all the information and evidence [plaintiff] needs to present his 
[discrimination] case.”); Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 568 (Wash. 1984) (“[T]here is 
the need of the adverse attorney for information which may be in the exclusive possession of the 
corporation and may be too expensive or impractical to collect through formal discovery.”).
9. See Bouge v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp., 132 F.r.D. 560, 565 (D. Utah 1990) (“[I]t must be recognized that 
contemporary litigation is costly and often the ‘little guy’ . . . is at a distinct disadvantage in the process.”).
10. n.Y. Comp. Codes r. & regs. tit. 22, § 1200 (2009); n.Y. Comp. Codes & regs. tit. 22, § 1200.33 
(1990).
11. See niesig v. Team I, 76 n.Y.2d 363 (1990).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., George B. Wyeth, Talking to the Other Side’s Employee’s and Ex-Employees, 4 Litig. 8–11 (1989) 
(former and low-level employees); Susan J. Becker, Conducting Informal Discovery of a Party’s Former 
Employees: Legal and Ethical Concerns and Constraints, 51 Md. L. rev. 239 (1992); robert S. Whitman, 
Ex Parte Contacts with an Adversary’s Former Employees, 237 nY.L.J. 4 (2007); John E. Iole & John D. 
Goetz, Ethics or Procedure? A Discovery-Based Approach to Ex Parte Contacts with Former Employees of a 
Corporate Adversary, 68 notre Dame L. rev. 81 (1992) (former employees); Walter Lucas, ABA Ethics 
Unit Approves Ex-Employees Interviews, 127 n.J.L.J. 1067 (1991); Marshall Lasser, An Attorney’s Right to 
Interview Ex Parte Employees of a Corporate Adversary, 74 Mich. B. J. 166 (1995); C. Evan Stewart, 
Ground Rules Shift for Ex Parte Interviews, 13 nat’l L. J. S6 (1991); Heidi L. Mcneil & Sara r. 
roberson, Ex Parte Communications with Former Employees of an Adversary: When are they Permitted?, 
ariz. att’y, Jan. 1996, at 19; Katt v. new York City Police Dep’t, no. 95 Civ. 8283, 1997 WL 394593, 
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 Surprisingly, the issue that remains largely unexamined is which higher-level 
employee witnesses are reachable for ex parte interviews—since Niesig did not 
completely ban such interviews. This inquiry is not easily resolved. The Niesig test 
fails to demarcate where the boundary-line rests along the organizational hierarchy 
beyond which attorneys may not pass.14 rather, the three-pronged test leaves 
attorneys, who wish both to zealously advocate for their clients and remain within 
the ethical lines, with an interpretive puzzle because the test is premised on general 
and open-ended principles of agency and evidence law that are unsuitable in the 
attorney disciplinary context. Deferring to agency and evidence law forces attorneys 
to probe into and verify the employee’s status before conducting ex parte interviews—an 
arduous and inexact operation.
 Much of the time, attorneys will actually request permission from the employer 
directly or from the court to conduct such interviews. This situation becomes problematic 
when an employer objects to an attorney’s request or judicial application to interview 
employees ex parte on the grounds that the employees are supervisors or managers. With 
such a representation from the employer, the employees are presumably off-limits under 
the Niesig test. Consequently, the attorney may abandon the discovery option, or a court 
may summarily hold that the employee’s title satisfies the Niesig test.
 Yet claiming that an employee is a supervisor or manager should not automatically 
render the employee a “party”—on the face of it, Niesig does not authorize so broad an 
interpretation. The effect would be inequitable. Consider, for example, a company that 
employs over 100,000 employees with varying supervisory and managerial levels. The 
company could use the disciplinary rule offensively to insulate its workforce from ex 
parte interviews solely based on titles,15 many of which might be simply decorative rather 
than an actual anointment of authority.16  Such a result would grant companies exclusive 
ownership and control over witnesses, a consequence that, as the Second Circuit has 
at *1 (S.D.n.Y. July 14, 1997) (low-level); Pritchard v. County of Erie, no. 04 Civ. 00534, 2007 WL 
1703832, at *5 (W.D.n.Y. June 12, 2007) (low-level); albany Med. Ctr. v. U.S., 04 Civ. 1399, 2006 WL 
4573714 (n.D.n.Y. oct. 17, 2006) (former employee); Wright v. Stern, no. 01 Civ. 4437, 2003 WL 
23095571, at *1 (S.D.n.Y. Dec. 30, 2003); Pauling v. Sec‘y of the Dep’t of Interior, no 95 Civ. 8408, 
1997 WL 661393, at *1 (S.D.n.Y. oct. 22, 1997) (low-level employee); Wright, 2003 WL 23095571 at 
*1 (same); Gidatex v. Campaniello Imps., Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d 119, 125 (S.D.n.Y. 1999) (low-level 
employees); Muriel Siebert & Co. v. Intuit, Inc., 8 n.Y.3d 506, 509 (2007) (former employee); Polycast 
Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., no. 87 Civ. 3297, 1990 WL 180571, at *2 (S.D.n.Y. nov. 15, 1990) 
(same); Judd v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc, no. 07 Civ. 7932, 2008 WL 906076, at *1 (S.D.n.Y. 
apr. 3, 2008) (same); Kingsway Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, LLP, no. 03 Civ. 5560, 
2006 WL 1520227, at *5 (S.D.n.Y. June 1, 2006) (former employees).
14. See Wright, 2003 WL 23095571, at *1; Burns v. Bank of am., no. 03 Civ. 1685, 2007 WL 1589437, at 
*14, n.12 (S.D.n.Y. June 4, 2007) (“[W]hether [the] communications [with an individual] who is 
certainly in a managerial position . . . would be allowed under Niesig is less clear but need not be decided 
for the purposes of the present motion.”).
15. See Frey v. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 106 F.r.D. 32 (E.D.n.Y. 1985) (a blanket ban would 
“permit [defendant] to barricade huge numbers of potential witnesses from interviews except through 
costly discovery procedures”).
16. one district court has noted, “[d]etermining what employees are managerial, however, can be difficult, 
especially as industry increasingly recognizes the efficiency advantages in many instances of delegation 
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made clear, is incompatible with “time-honored and decision-honored principles . . . that 
counsel for all parties have a right to interview an adverse party’s witnesses (the witness 
willing) in private, without the presence or consent of opposing counsel.”17
 While each prong of the alter-ego test suffers from its own infirmities, when an 
attorney seeks to interview an employee fact witness, the main prong of the test used 
is whether the employee is able to “bind” the company.18 In its current state, the 
binding prong does not effectively help attorneys identify which managerial or 
supervisory witnesses are parties. The bases for the binding prong—agency and 
evidence law—are uninformative and raise more questions than they answer.19 an 
effective disciplinary rule should be composed in a manner that provides clear 
guidance; such is fundamental for regulating attorney conduct. If a rule requires 
judicial clarification, the resultant test should then provide clear guidance. rule 4.2 
is unreasonably vague in relation to organizational parties, and its judicially-created 
companion Niesig test fails to fill in the gaps, a deficiency which invites a broad and 
inconsistent range of consequences.
 aggressive attorneys who attempt their own interpretation of the binding prong 
and conduct ex parte interviews risk disciplinary sanctions. This threat may also 
induce less aggressive attorneys to forsake the method altogether, potentially losing 
access to valuable information and forcing them to resort to more expensive and 
cumbersome formal methods. or attorneys may seek wasteful discovery on the 
ancillary issue of an employee’s authority, unnecessarily prolonging and burdening 
the litigation.20 Finally, the binding prong does not promote judicial efficiency 
because it inevitably requires courts to determine whether or not an employee should 
be designated a party. In so doing, attorneys reveal their legal strategy, which 
undermines the purpose of the informal interview.
 accordingly, the new York Court of appeals should further explain the term 
“binding.” Stated differently, the prong requires a practical instrumental basis to make 
it more operational. agency and evidence law alone are inadequate. This article argues 
that the national Labor relations act’s “supervisor” test will provide a better basis for 
the binding prong because it will establish a clearer bright-line standard to determine 
when employee fact witnesses, high-level ones in particular, are able to bind the 
employer. The nLra supervisor test comports well with the current jurisprudential 
bases of the Niesig test and will improve the functionality of the binding prong.
of decisionmaking authority to the working level.” Chambers v. Capital Cities/aBC, 159 F.r.D. 441, 
443 (S.D.n.Y. 1995).
17. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1975). 
18. For the purposes of this article, fact witness employees are those that do not expose the entity to 
vicarious liability (imputation prong) or associate with counsel (counsel prong). They are the bystanders 
who see the events that have given rise to a cause of action. 
19. See niesig v. Team I, 76 n.Y.2d 363, 373–75 (1990).
20. See Niesig, 76 n.Y.2d at 377 (Bellacosa, J., concurring) (The test may “replace a useful and straightforward ex 
parte interview with a whole new and expensive litigation tier. . . . [T]he purpose of pretrial discovery—or 
the ultimate litigation question itself—may well be which employees fit into the protected ‘party’ category.”).
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 Part I provides a historical overview of american ethical oversight, highlighting 
the change in oversight from broad standards to regulatory commands and the effect 
of that evolution on the goals of oversight. Part II specifically focuses on the history 
of the no-contact rule prior to Niesig. While the rule itself has undergone minimal 
changes since it first appeared in the nineteenth century, both new York bar 
associations and courts have struggled to clarify the meaning of “party” in the 
organizational arena, devising numerous tests.
 Part III examines the appropriate composition of disciplinary rules as opposed to 
standards or aspirational commands. When an ethical directive subjects attorneys to 
punitive sanctions, it must provide clear, prospective guidance. If the directive leaves 
attorneys guessing or unsure, it fails. Part IV discusses the shortcomings of Niesig, 
focusing on how the doctrines of agency and evidence are inadequate bases to assist 
attorneys in determining when high-level employees are able to bind their employer. 
Part V outlines the basic concepts of the nLra supervisor test. By explicitly defining 
a supervisor, the test helps articulate a hierarchal boundary beyond which attorneys 
may not pass.
 Finally, Part VI outlines procedural and evidentiary requirements that parties should 
satisfy either to conduct or preclude ex parte interviews, taking into account the purposes 
of the rule and the interests of all parties. Currently, no uniform procedure is used. 
Instead, both sides have pursued an array of measures in an effort to protect themselves.
I. A BRIEf HIStORY Of AmERICAN LEgAL EtHICAL OVERSIgHt
 The development of american legal ethical oversight has become a familiar 
history.21 Ethical oversight grew out of a movement to restore and ensure the integrity, 
stature, and public trust of the legal profession. To reestablish the profession’s honor, 
legal ethicists pressed classical republican values, which promoted a greater balance 
between the interests of the social polity and the client. at the same time, the focus 
of legal ethics has shifted from generalized moral standards toward particularized 
regulations. These two divergent social standards have often collided with one 
another. The more regulated the system has become, the more it has progressively 
diminished the traditional moral characteristics, prized by a profession self-
proclaimed as guardians of the law. This gradual sea change has garnered a great 
deal of scholarly debate over whether narrow, legalistic commands or general, 
instructive propositions better serve the profession and the law.22
21. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 53–63 (West Publishing Co. 1986); Geoffrey 
C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 Yale L. J. 1239, 1249–53 (1991); James M. altman, 
Considering the A.B.A’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 Fordham L. rev. 2395 (2003); andrew M. Perlman, 
Toward a Unified Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 Fla. L. rev. 977, 999–1009 (2003); allison 
Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, 49 ala. L. 
rev. 471 (1998); Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding 
the Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 1117, 1125–45 (1999).
22. Compare Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, 80 
Iowa L. rev. 901, 910 (1995) (a “code of positive law cannot serve this prefatory function by placing 
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 A. The Professional Temperament in the Early 20th Century
 During the early twentieth century, the legal profession was still recovering from a 
dramatic decline in public perception. In his 1953 history, The Lawyer from Antiquity to 
Modern Times, roscoe Pound described the era from the 1830s to 1870s as an “Era of 
Decadence,” characterized by rapid deprofessionalization.23 The profession lacked 
uniform and rigorous standards and requirements for education, bar admission, and 
practice.24 Many states had, in fact, eliminated educational requirements, while other 
states substantially reduced them. In some instances, courts were legislatively restricted 
from reviewing and nullifying relaxed admissions policies.25 While Jeffersonian and 
Jacksonian democratic ideals effectively loosened the aristocratic grip over the profession, 
they also left it without a national institutional infrastructure and the standards and 
traditions such institutionalism might otherwise foster.26 nearly any individual was 
admitted to practice, regardless of professional or educational aptitude or level of formal 
education. as a result of this de-institutionalization, “the bar was not,” Pound observed, 
“to be regarded as a profession, but as a mere private, money-making occupation,” 
reducing the vocation into a trade.27 In addition, with licenses granted indiscriminately, 
unethical and unprofessionalized attorneys could easily prey on the socially vulnerable, 
further injuring the profession’s reputation.28 Beginning in the 1870s, states gradually 
began devising ethical codes, improving educational standards, and toughening bar 
admission requirements.29 Local and state bar associations also began to emerge, with the 
express mandate to fortify the profession’s stature.30
 Despite late nineteenth-century advances, the profession remained largely 
unchanged and vulnerable at the turn of the century,31 particularly in a national climate 
of expanding capital and corporate growth. Many in the profession had allied themselves 
with wealthy, corporate interests, helping them circumvent or invalidate restrictive 
economic legislation and defeat social litigation. Many attorneys subordinated civic 
 ethics outside the sphere of law. Such a positivist misplacement of ethics will prevent lawyers from 
being guided by ‘conscience,’ thereby stif ling ethics.”) with Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity 
Thesis, 52 ohio St. L.J. 551 (1991) (attorneys may act with integrity within a positivist ethical system).
23. roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from antiquity to Modern Times 221 (1953).
24. See id. at 227–29.
25. See id. at 230.
26. See id. at 234–37; see also Harlan F. Stone, Law and its administration 172 (1915).
27. Pound, supra note 23, at 232; see also Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of american Law 
1780–1860 253 (1977) (“Law, once conceived of as protective, regulative, paternalistic and, above all, a 
paramount expression of the moral sense of the community, had come to be thought of as a facilitative of 
individual desires and as simply reflective of the existing organization of economic and political power.”).
28. Stone, supra note 26, at 170.
29. Pound, supra note 23, at 253–85.
30. See Pound, supra note 23, at 253–78.
31. Pound noted that “[t]he harm which this deprofessionalizing of the practice of law did to the law, to legal 
procedures, to the ethics of practice and to forensic conduct has outlived the era.” Pound, supra note 23.
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and social interests to their own and to those of wealthy clients. In a 1905 address at 
Harvard, Louis Brandeis lamented that lawyers had “allowed themselves to become 
adjuncts of great corporations and have neglected the obligation to use their powers for 
the protection of the people.”32 Brandeis worried that the profession’s ability to help 
“capitalists” overcome welfare regulations would accelerate and amplify economic 
disparity, igniting social unrest.33 That same year also in an address at Harvard, 
President Theodore roosevelt scorned: “[T]he great lawyer who employs his talent 
and his learning in the highly remunerative task of enabling a very wealthy client to 
override or circumvent the law is doing all that in him lies to encourage the growth in 
this county of a spirit of dumb anger against all laws and of disbelief in their efficacy.”34 
roosevelt called on the profession to act as bulwarks against monied interests who 
were a “menace to our community.”35 Later, Harlan F. Stone reflected: “The tremendous 
economic changes which took place in this country . . . exercised a powerful influence 
on the bar” giving “us a new type of lawyer . . . who, at his worst, is the mere hired man 
of corporations.”36 Stone blamed the deterioration of the bar on the “loss of community 
interest and loss of pride of professional caste in the legal profession.”37
 In speeches before bar associations and graduating law school classes, a number 
of less prominent figures echoed the sentiments of national leaders regarding the 
ethical condition and direction of the profession. In a 1902 address before John 
Marshall Law School, Judge James Jenkins of the Seventh Circuit advised students 
against “sharp practice” and “trickery,” urging them not to make monetary wealth 
their sole aim because it “begets avarice or indolence, and either endangers the lawyer, 
dulling the eye of appreciation for the lofty principles of action which the law 
inculcates, stupefying zeal in its pursuits.”38 In order to harmonize the relationship 
between the profession and community, an attorney before the new York State Bar 
association (nYSBa) in 1904 argued for the need to remove “speculative actions,” 
“chicanery,” and “ambulance-chasing” from the profession.39 That same year, speaking 
32. Louis D. Brandeis, an Exhortation to organized Labor (Feb. 5, 1905), in Business, a Profession, 
321 (Small, Maynard & Co. 1914).
33. Id. at 323 (“The immense corporate wealth will necessarily develop a hostility from which much trouble 
will come to us unless the excesses of capital are curbed . . . There will come a revolt of the people 
against the capitalists unless the aspirations of the people are given some adequate legal expression; and 
to this end cooperation of the abler lawyers is essential.”).
34. Theodore roosevelt, Harvard Commencement address, The Harvard Spirit (June 28, 1905), in The 
Harv. Graduates’ Mag., Sept. 1905, at 8, available at www.archive.org/stream/
presidentialadd16roosrich/presidentialadd16roosrich_djvu.txt.
35. Id. at 7.
36. Stone, supra note 26, at 176.
37. Id. at 166.
38. James G. Jenkins, Judge of the United States Court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit, address before 
the Graduating Class of John Marshall Law School 7, 9–10 (June 16, 1902).
39. Edward P. White, address before the new York State Bar association, Changed Conditions in the 
Practice of Law 10 (Jan. 19, 1904).
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before the allegheny County Bar association, another attorney stressed the need for 
professional independence from special, monied interests.40 In 1905, Judge Irving Vann 
of the new York Court of appeals warned the graduating class of albany Law School 
that “[t]he commercial spirit, which, to an alarming extent, has invaded the bar, is the 
cause of many abuses, and among the most serious is the setting on of lawsuits for the 
simple purpose of making money.”41 He stressed that success was not “measured by 
money” but must “embrace something more,” which he defined as being aids in the 
“administration of justice.”42 Later that year, in an address before the american Bar 
association, an attorney noted that there was no room in the profession for “the purely 
mercenary” attorneys “who view the calling as a trade, as merely the means of gaining 
a livelihood.”43 This small sampling captures the profession’s state of disaffection and 
greed at the turn of the twentieth century, even as it demonstrates the ethos of reform 
through appeals to reconnect the profession to a higher-purpose.
 B. The Canons of Professional Ethics
 For its part, the american Bar association (aBa) adopted the Canons of 
Professional Ethics in 1908, which contained thirty-two standards of conduct.44 The 
Canons were hortatory and moralistic in tone and scope, largely leaving attorneys to 
consult their own judgment. according to the legal historian Geoffrey Hazard, the 
Canons were not binding tenets, but “were used primarily as guides to the ethical 
duties of lawyers and as standards of professionalism.”45 While not originally intended 
to possess “the force and effect of statutes,” over time, the Canons became “recognized 
by the Bench and Bar as establishing wholesome standards for professional conduct,” 
which courts enforced or used as guidance in attorney disciplinary proceedings.46
 The Code’s rhetoric promoted an ideology grounded in classical republican values 
of citizenship—in this instance, the citizen-attorney’s duty to the social polity. as 
40. David Thompson Watson, address at the allegheny County Bar association annual Dinner, The 
Profession 3–4 (Feb. 12, 1904) (“our inf luence is of great importance in preventing rash and unwise 
legislation . . . in restraining the improper use of great power for mere selfish and material end. But to 
do this . . . the Bar must be united and independent and, above all else, be solely a profession, be 
composed of professional men who are apart from trade and commerce . . . . never be owned by any 
corporations, or any man, or any interest.”).
41. Irving G. Vann, address at the Commencement of albany Law School (May 31, 1905), in Irving G. 
Vann, Contingent Fees: address in Hubbard Course on Legal Ethics: Delivered at the 
Commencement of albany Law School 4 (1905).
42. Id. at 2.
43. Lucien Hugh alexander, address at the annual Meeting of the american Bar ass’n (aug. 23, 1905), in 
Lucien Hugh alexander, Some requirements for admission to the Bar Considered apart 
from Educational Standards 1 (1905).
44. Code of Prof’l Ethics (1908).
45. Hazard, supra note 21, at 1239, n.77.
46. In re Connelly, 240 n.Y.S.2d 126, 130 (1st Dep’t 1963); see also In re Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 487 (Mass. 
1928); Hunter v. Troup, 315 Ill. 293, 302 (Ill. 1925).
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Simeon Baldwin, one of the founders of the aBa, observed:, “The new code of the 
american Bar association makes no such appeals to motives of expediency and self-
advantage. It occupies a higher plane . . . the good of the republic is looked at, not 
that of the individual”47 according to Charles Wolfram, the Canons “insisted that a 
lawyer pursue the high road in every endeavor mentioned.”48 To that end, the 
Preamble outlines the scope of the attorney’s role. For the aBa, the Canons were a 
public declaration of the legal profession’s commitment to the rule of law and its 
importance to society. The aBa reminded the profession that the stability of justice 
“rests upon the approval of the people.”49 The public’s trust in the administration of 
law “cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members of 
our profession are such as to merit the approval of all just men.”50 accordingly, the 
welfare of society rested on the ethical conduct of attorneys. The Code’s provisions 
reinforced this ideology. Many provisions explicitly connected the specified conduct 
to the interests of justice and the legal system.51 others simply set forth general 
platitudes for attorneys to adhere, such as civility, respect, candor, punctuality, 
expedition, and fairness.52 In the final catchall Canon, the aBa summarized that 
through adherence to ethical commands “a lawyer will find his highest honor in a 
deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man 
and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.”53
 The Canon’s republican character fashioned two client types to which an attorney 
was bound.54 at the immediate level, attorneys zealously represent the party who 
retains them. More abstractly, attorneys serve the collective, which we might think 
of as the meta-client. Even in the private sphere, when not in the service of a client, 
attorneys represent the meta-client. The well-being of the meta-client acts as a moral 
compass directing attorneys in their personal and professional affairs. In this way, 
what is good for the collective defines the lawyer’s ethical action on behalf of the 
individual client. By grounding ethical conduct in a higher purpose, attorneys would 
presumably act, not from self-interest or a fear of punitive threat, but in a kind of 
stewardship to safeguard society.
 The Canons were based on the alabama State Bar association Code of Ethics of 
1887—the first code of legal ethics.55 The Preamble to the alabama Code evinces a 
similar republican tone: “The purity and efficiency of judicial administration . . . 
47. Simeon E. Baldwin, The New American Code of Legal Ethics, 8 Colum. L. rev. 541, 542 (1908).
48. Wolfram, supra note 21 at 54.
49. Code of Prof’l Ethics pmbl. (1908).
50. Id. 
51. See, e.g., id. at Canons 1, 5, 15, 20, 28, 29, 30, 32.
52. See, e.g., id. at Canons 1, 3, 21, 22, 24.
53. Id. at Canon 32.
54. See generally aBa Comm. on Code of Prof ’l Ethics, Final report (1908).
55. Model Code of Prof’l responsibility Preface (1969).
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[d]epends as much upon the character, conduct, and demeanor of attorneys in this 
great trust, as upon the fidelity and learning of courts, or the honesty and intelligence 
of juries.”56 The Code was rooted in the work of David Hoffman and Judge George 
Sharswood,57 both of whom worried about the precarious position of the lawyer, 
namely, the danger of the steward’s proximity to the contagion of moral and social 
corruption. In his 1836 treatise, Hoffman asserted that the profession “brings its 
ministers into a too intimate and dangerous acquaintance with man’s depravity; it places 
them in the midst of temptations; and whilst engaged in rescuing others, they sometimes 
fall the only lamented victims.”58 attorneys needed to conduct themselves ethically 
because “any known departure from this excites more than ordinary distrust . . . 
Character, therefore, and the best of manners are to the lawyer invaluable.”59  In his 
1860 essay, Sharswood similarly warned: “[T]here are pitfalls and man-traps at every 
step, and the mere youth . . . needs often the prudence and self-denial . . . which belong 
commonly to riper years. High moral principle is his only safe guide; the only torch to 
light his way amidst darkness and obstruction.”60 Despite their shared views of 
corruption as contagion, the two men differed radically about what constituted the 
lawyer’s principal allegiance, his or her sworn duty. Hoffman instructed attorneys to 
act “with an eye solely to his country’s good.”61 according to allison Marston, on the 
other hand, Sharswood separated “the moral responsibility of lawyers from that of 
society at large,” attaching it instead “to the client’s interests.”62 This fundamental 
question—a recurring dilemma—about whether the lawyer’s primary duty was to 
society, and thus, more abstractly, to the law, or to the client, redounds throughout 
the history of the profession.
 C.  The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
 The Canons survived largely unchanged until 1969, when the aBa enacted the 
Model Code of Professional responsibility, a code that modernized and ultimately 
superseded the Canons. The aBa Special Committee of Evaluation of Ethical 
Standards concluded that the Canons “were not an effective teaching instrument” and 
56. ala. Code of Ethics pmbl. (1887).
57. Model Code of Prof’l responsibility Preface (1969).
58. David Hoffman, a Course of Legal Study 745 (Thomas, Cowperthait & Co. 2d Ed. 1846) 
(1836).
59. Id. at 747–48.
60. George Sharswood, an Essay on Professional Ethics 1 (1860).
61. Hoffman, supra note 58, at 751.
62. Marston, supra note 21, at 495. Compare Sharswood, supra note 60, at 27 (“The lawyer, who refuses his 
professional assistance because in his judgment the case is unjust and indefensible, usurps the functions 
of both judge and jury.”) with Hoffman, supra note 58 (persons “who have violated the laws . . . are 
entitled to no such special exertions from any member of our pure and honorable professional; and 
indeed, to no intervention beyond scouring to them a fair and dispassionate investigation of the facts of 
their cause, and the due application of the law; all that goes beyond this . . . is unprofessional.”) (emphasis 
in original).
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“many [were] abounded with quaint expressions of the past.”63 Some provisions were 
poorly organized and others overlapped with one another.64 They were also unsuitable 
for attorneys whose practices spanned various settings in an increasingly regulated 
industrialized and urbanized world, particularly with the rise of large-scale corporate 
law firms and in-house counsel departments.65 according to Wolfram, the Canons had 
assumed a homogeneous profession conformable to a common set of standards.66
 The Code consists of three parts: 1) Canons, 2) Ethical Considerations, and 3) 
Disciplinary rules.67 The Canons in the Code are “statements of axiomatic norms” 
intended to “embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations 
and Disciplinary rules are derived.”68 They are broad, aphoristic statements that 
function as subject-headings. For example, Canon 7, under which the no-contact 
rule is listed, states, “a lawyer . . . is to represent [a] client zealously within the 
bounds of the law.”69 Similarly, the Ethical Considerations are intended to be strictly 
“aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of 
the profession should strive.”70 They provide explanatory commentary and general 
practice guideposts. The Disciplinary rules, in contrast, are “mandatory” and “state 
the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject 
to disciplinary action.”71
 With the Disciplinary rules, the aBa transformed ethical oversight into positive 
law.72 according to Hazard, “whereas the Canons and the Ethical Considerations 
represented fraternal understandings that memorialized a shared group discourse, 
the [Disciplinary rules] functioned as a statute defining the legal contours of a 
vocation.”73 The result was a reduction in the moral tenor. an ethic is a general, 
axiomatic statement of human conduct, which does not dissolve at the border of a 
polity. But once conduct becomes memorialized as positive law, the moral 
considerations of the actor become inconsequential; the underlying connective and 
educative force of the ethic is muted or disposed. The legality of an action instead 
63. Model Code of Prof’l responsibility Preface (1969).
64. See id.
65. See Daly, supra note 21, at 1127–28; see also Model Code of Prof’l responsibility Preface (1969) 
(one reason for the amendment was the “changed and changing conditions in our legal system and 
urbanized society required new statements of professional principles.”).
66. Wolfram, supra note 21, at 54.
67. Model Code of Prof’l responsibility Preliminary Statement (1969).
68. Id.
69. Id. 
70. Model Code of Prof’l responsibility Canon 7 (1969).
71. Model Code of Prof’l responsibility Preliminary Statement (1969).
72. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “positive law” as “law promulgated and implemented within a particular 
political community by political superiors, as distinct from moral law or law existing in an ideal 
community or in some nonpolitical community.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1200 (8th ed. 2004).
73. Hazard, supra note 21, at 1251.
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becomes central, narrowing the focus to the time, place, and circumstances of an 
occurrence. Ironically, as the profession sought to reform itself, the positivist direction 
of oversight threatened to diminish the collectivist vision in favor of self-interest (in 
particular, eluding punitive penalties) as the incentive for ethical conduct.
 The aBa, nonetheless, still peddled republican rhetoric. While entirely rewritten, 
the Preamble echoed the logic and sentiments of the original Canon’s introduction. 
according to the aBa, if the rule of law is central to a free and democratic society 
then “[l]awyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of 
society.”74 as stewards of the polity, lawyers needed to command society’s respect 
and confidence, which they garner from “the highest standards of ethical conduct.”75 
The Preamble reminds attorneys that because the Code merely provides minimum 
directives of conduct, they must also consult their consciences as though the 
understanding of ethics and morality were universal and the conscience had some 
access to that truth beyond the experiences of the individual.76
 Yet differences emerge. one important divergence between the two Preambles is 
that, for the first time, the Code emphasizes the punitive consequences of unethical 
practices. It warns attorneys to act ethically to avoid professional repercussions, 
whether official sanctions or community disapproval, making self-interest an 
important component of ethical oversight.77 Conduct was no longer rooted solely in a 
civic responsibility toward the polity as a result of positivism. The Code, therefore, 
possessed a paradoxical framework. It simultaneously advanced aspirational goals 
and obligatory commands; and it instructed attorneys to protect the social entity and 
themselves equally. as a result, the Code was quickly regarded as ineffective.
 D. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
 By the mid-1970s, the aBa determined that the Code needed a complete 
structural overhaul.78 The aBa Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards 
resolved to adopt the “restatement” format and abandon the tripartite structure.79 
The Commission concluded that the prior format frequently forced attorneys to sift 
through numerous provisions to determine the correct course of conduct.80 
additionally, the substantive effects of the Code’s Canons and Ethical Considerations 
74. Model Code of Prof’l responsibility pmbl. (1969).
75. Id.
76. See id. (“Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstones against which to test the 
extent to which his actions should rise above minimum standards.”).
77. See id. (“[I]t is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of his profession and of the 
society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of 
ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction.”).
78. See roger J. Kutak, Chairman, aBa Comm. on Evaluation of Prof’l Standards, report to 
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led to confusion, encouraging the Code’s uneven application.81 The broad statements 
propounded by the Canons and Ethical Consideration failed to “provide reliable 
guidance to a lawyer seeking to determine what the ethical standards of the profession 
require in specific situations.”82 In fact, “[t]he breadth of the language of Canons 
goes far beyond the scope of specific Disciplinary rules with the result that a Canon’s 
standard may infinitely extend application of Disciplinary rules or impose an 
independent standard apart from any Disciplinary rule.”83 In some instances, courts 
actually converted the aspirational goals into additional obligatory commands.84
 Finally, in 1983, the aBa House of Delegates adopted the Model rules of 
Professional Conduct.85 The rules consisted of approximately fifty black-letter laws 
each accompanied by an explanatory comments section.86 The new organization 
“provides lawyers with rules in a convenient organization to which they can 
comfortably turn for answers to questions of professional responsibility.”87 While the 
aBa reduced the broad and indefinite language, it did not completely remove the 
dualistic framework from oversight. The majority of the rules were obligatory, 
meaning that they sought to “define proper conduct for purposes of professional 
discipline.”88 Yet, the rules retained a number of “permissive” directives, leaving 
attorneys some “discretion to exercise professional judgment.”89
 With the restatement format, the aBa nonetheless still took a larger step toward 
positive law and away from moral standards.90 Wolfram noted that the rules made 
“no effort to define or explore the moral dimensions of the law practice.”91 The rules 
merely maintain that they “do not . . . exhaust the moral and ethical considerations 
that should inform lawyers.”92 The aBa removed much of the lofty, inspirational 
republican rhetoric from the preamble replacing it with a list of thirteen 
“responsibilities” of lawyers that primarily focus on lawyers’ obligations at the 





85. Model rules of Prof’l Conduct Preface (1983).
86. Kutak, supra note 78. 
87. Id. 
88. Model rules of Prof’l Conduct Scope (1983).
89. Id.
90. See Daly, supra note 21, at 1123. Hazard has noted, “the rules were rendered in statutory language . . . . 
[T]he rules affirmed that the standards of professional conduct were legal obligations and not merely 
professional ones.” Hazard, supra note 21, at 1254.
91. Wolfram, supra note 21, at 70.
92. Model rules of Prof’l Conduct Scope (1983).
93. See id. at pmbl.
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 Specifically, the responsibilities articulate that the basic principles underlying the 
rules “include the lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate 
interests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous 
and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system.”94 What republican 
rhetoric remains is either subordinated to the official administrative tone of the 
responsibilities or remains as a kind of rhetorical garnish to the imperative tone of 
official policy.95 By disconnecting ethical oversight from its civic, moralistic mooring in 
a presumed higher standard, an attorney’s ethical foundation consequently came to rest 
exclusively on self-preservation.96 oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., in his well-known The 
Path of the Law, predicated this potential effect of positivism. according to Holmes, 
the difference between law and morality is that “[i]f you want to know the law and 
nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material 
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who 
finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer 
sanctions of conscience.”97 Whether Holmes’ conclusion is accurate remains a scholarly 
debate today—can morality with its epistemic limitations effectively govern a collective 
group, or can positive law promote moral reflection beyond the legal text?98
II. A BRIEf HIStORY Of tHE NO-CONtACt RuLE
 A. The No-Contact Rule prior to the Canons of Professional Ethics
 Despite the broader changes in ethical oversight since the nineteenth century, the 
no-contact rule has remained largely static. In his 1837 treatise, Hoffman offered 
one of the first statements of the rule in his list of ethical resolutions: “I will never 
enter into any conversation with my opponent’s clients, relative to his claim or 
defence, except with the consent, and in the presence of his counsel”—a fairly absolute 
prohibition on any communication, leaving little, if any, room for an exception.99 
Hoffman does not discuss the basis for the rule. His view regarding the need for 
ethical resolutions, however, suggests that the rule serves to protect the public from 
attorneys, who having been too long exposed to the corruptions around them, become 
themselves corrupt. Professor John Leubsdorf located a less obligatory form of the 
rule in an English authority from around the same time period: 
94. Model rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. (2002).
95. one passage reminds attorneys that among other roles, attorneys are “public citizen[s] having [a] special 
responsibility for the quality of justice.” Id. another passage with republican rhetoric is tucked away in 
the last statement of the Preamble. Furthermore, the Preamble reminds attorneys that ethical conduct 
must serve the public interest rather than the “parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar,” but this 
statement seems present solely so that the bar may remain self-regulating. Id.
96. Daly, supra note 21, at 1123 (“The virtues of rules—predictability and stability—are thus transformed 
into vices—excessive autonomy and alienated individualism.”).
97. oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. rev. 457, 459 (1897).
98. See supra note 21.
99. Hoffman, supra note 58, at 771 (emphasis omitted).
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Let your love of harmony lead you to recommend your clients to make greater 
concessions, for the sake of tranquility, than rigid justice could require; and 
even dare to sacrifice punctilio to concord, when you believe an interview 
with the adverse party will be more conductive to the extinction of animosity, 
the settlement of a dispute, and the renewal of good-will, than any negotiation 
with his legal adviser.100
 This construction, as Leubsdorf notes, created more of “a professional courtesy 
than a binding tenet.”101
 Despite Hoffman’s resolution, much of the nineteenth century is silent on the 
subject. Sharswood never mentions it in his lectures.102 The no-contact rule eventually 
resurfaces in the alabama Code of Ethics of 1887: “an attorney should not attempt 
to compromise with the opposite party, without notifying his client if practicable . . . 
no[r] engage in discussion or arguments about the merits of the case with the opposite 
party, without notice to his attorney.”103 The language here is more suggestive and 
discretionary than the absolutist, moral tone of Hoffman’s resolution, affording 
attorneys some room to engage in ex parte settlement discussions, particularly when 
notifying opposing counsel is impractical or impossible. Prior to the Canons, a 
number of state bar associations, such as Georgia and Maryland, adopted alabama’s 
version of the rule.104 There does not appear, though, to be any published case 
employing the rule.
 B. The No-Contact Rule From the Canons to the Model Rules
 The aBa included the no-contact rule in the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics 
under Canon 9, which stated:
a lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy 
with a party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to 
negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his 
counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything 
that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he should 
not undertake to advise him as to the law.105
 The Canon covered nearly all types of communications, expressly prohibiting 
subject matter, settlement, misleading, and advisory communications with adverse 
parties. But the provision is uninformative regarding organizational parties.
100. John Leubsdorf, Communicating with another Lawyer’s Client: the Lawyer’s Veto and the Client’s Interests, 
127 U. Pa. L. rev. 683, 684 (1979) (quoting Letters From a.C. & W.H. Buckland, to an 
attorney’s Clerk, Containing Directions For His Studies and General Conduct 226 
(1837)).
101. Id.
102. See Sharswood, supra note 60.
103. alabama Code of Ethics (1887).
104. See Maryland Code of Ethics (1903); Georgia Code of Ethics (1889).
105. Code of Prof’l Ethics Canon 9 (1908).
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 although the Canon offered little rationale for itself, shortly after its enactment, 
Gleason L. archer, dean and founder of Suffolk School of Law, provided an early 
justification for the rule in his 1910 treatise, concentrating on the consequences of 
improper communications.106 Such communications threatened to harm opposing 
counsel because they “affront him personally and by implication [] affirm that he is 
unworthy of his high profession.”107 an adverse party is endangered because he is 
“not qualified to match his own imperfect knowledge of his rights against the 
persuasion of his opponent’s lawyer, who is seeking the advantage for his client.”108 
attorneys damage their own reputation because “it is unprofessional, if not positively 
dishonorable, to deal with an adversary behind the back of his lawyer.”109 Finally, the 
profession suffers because once attorneys “show mutual disrespect and play mean, 
underhanded tricks upon each other, just so soon do they lose standing in the 
community and become the objects of contempt and reproach.”110 These rationales 
would compose the overarching justification of the rule under later amendments.111
 In 1969, the aBa superseded Canon 9 with Disciplinary rule 7-104 (Dr 7-104)
of the Model Code, which stated: 
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not (1) 
communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the 
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that 
matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other 
party.112
 While the directive remained identical for all intents and purposes, the aBa did 
remove the examples of communications in favor of simply precluding communications 
related to the subject matter of the representation, which is relatively indefinite 
language itself. Ethical Consideration 18, which corresponded with Dr 7-104, 
provided only a general purpose behind the rule and instructed an attorney who 
speaks with an unrepresented person to refrain from giving legal advice.113 other 
than that, the Consideration provided no instructive guidance regarding the issue of 
organizational parties.114
106. Gleason L. archer, Ethical obligations of the Lawyer 154–57 (Little, Brown & Co. 1910).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 156.
109. Id. at 157.
110. Id. at 156.
111. See Model rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4.2 cmt. 1 (2002) (“This rule contributes to the proper 
functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in 
a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers.”).
112. Model Code of Prof’l responsibility Dr 7-104 (1969).
113. See id. at EC 7-18.
114. See id.
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 The aBa next adopted Model rule 4.2, which borrowed the language of its 
predecessor nearly verbatim.115 The central difference was that the Comments 
section, unlike Ethical Consideration 18, provided an explicit method for identifying 
employee “parties.”116 Comment 4 defined an organizational “party” as including: 1) 
managerial employees; 2) persons whose acts or omissions in connection with the 
matter at issue may be imputed to the corporation for liability; or 3) persons whose 
statements constitute admissions by the corporation.117 Courts did not enthusiastically 
embrace the Comment 4 test. Instead, over the next decade, the bench devised an 
array of approaches for identifying parties: the case-by-case balancing test, the 
blanket ban, the alter-ego test, the speaking-agent test, the managing-agent test, the 
control-group test, and the scope-of-employment test.118
 In 2002, the aBa revised the Comments to rule 4.2, redefining an organizational 
party as: 
[a] constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly 
consults with the organization’s lawyer concerning the matter or has authority 
to obligate the organization with respect to the matter or whose act or 
omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization 
for purposes of civil or criminal liability.119 
 The new construction is particularly peculiar. aside from the imputation 
language, the added language—“obligate” and “constituent”—has little legal pedigree 
for interpretation. Courts and rulemaking bodies have not utilized these terms in 
substantive areas, let alone the disciplinary context, leaving courts and litigants with 
very little in the way of material for interpretation.
 absent from the revised Comment of rule 4.2 is a category that focuses on the 
general status of an employee, which the original Comment had addressed in the 
“managerial” employee prong. The aBa deleted that prong because it had “been 
criticized as vague and overly broad.”120 The focus on a constituent’s authority does 
not replace the “managerial” prong, but it acts more like the third Niesig prong that 
deems employees who implement the advice of counsel to be a party. The aBa also 
115. See Model rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4.2 (1983).
116. Compare Model Code of Prof’l responsibility EC 7-18 (1969) with Model rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 4.2 cmt. 4 (1983).
117. See Model rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4.2 cmt. 4 (1983).
118. See, e.g., Fair auto. repair, Inc. v. Car-X Serv. Sys., Inc., 128 Ill. app. 3d 763, 771 (Ill. app. Ct. 1984) 
(control-group test); Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash.2d 192, 200 (1984) (speaking-agent 
test); Cagguila v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 127 F.r.D. 653, 654–55 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (blanket ban); Morrison 
v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.r.D. 14, 18 (D. Mass. 1989) (balancing test); Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., no. 75 
Civ. 2232, 1981 WL 334, at *1 (S.D.n.Y. nov. 19, 1981) (managing-agent test); niesig v. Team I, 76 
n.Y.2d 363, 374 (1990) (alter-ego test).
119. Model rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2002). In the 2002 amendments, Comment 4 became 
Comment 7 under rule 4.2.
120. aBa Ethics 2000 Comm., report on the Model rules of Prof’l Conduct, reporter’s Explanation 
of Changes, r. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/10-85rem.pdf.
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removed from the Comment the prohibition on communications with anyone “whose 
statement may constitute an admission” because it too was considered “broad and 
potentially open-ended” and “ha[d] been read by some as prohibiting communication 
with any person whose testimony would be admissible against the organization.”121 
according to one federal district court, the new “obligate” prong replaced the 
“admission” prong, which ideally limits the reach of the prong. The court correlated 
an employee’s “authority to obligate” as a speaking-authority pursuant to the Second 
restatement of agency, which maintains that an agent’s statements are admissible 
evidence against a principal only if the agent is authorized to speak on behalf of the 
principal,122 a scope much narrower than the vicarious admission rule under the 
Federal rules Evidence on which the admission prong was based. Even though a 
majority of states have adopted the 2002 amendment,123 courts have only raised the 
revised Comment to rule 4.2 on a few occasions, providing little discussion.124
 C. The No-Contact Rule in New York Prior to niesig
 The new York State Bar association adopted the Canons in 1909,125 yet with the 
exception of one case in 1930, neither it nor the new York courts referenced Canon 
9 until the late-1960s. In three of the four cases published in the 1960s, the new 
York appellate courts narrowly addressed attorneys who negotiated settlements 
directly with individual parties.126 In the fourth case, a trial court used Canon 9, 
among other grounds, as a basis to preclude a defendant’s insurer from contacting the 
plaintiff ex parte.127 During that time, the new York State Bar association’s ethics 
opinions also focused on narrow issues unrelated to organizational parties.128 new 
York federal courts, on the other hand, do not appear to have ever even mentioned 
Canon 9 during the Canon period.
121. Id.
122. Mendez v. Hovensa, L.L.C, 49 V.I. 849, 861 (D.V.I. 2008).
123. aBa Model rules of Professional Conduct, State adoption of Model rules, http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html (stating that “[t]o date, California is the only states [sic] that do not have 
professional conduct rules that follow the format of the aBa Model rules of Professional Conduct).
124. See, e.g., Mendez, 49 V.I. at 859–60; Wasmer v. ohio Dep’t of rehab. and Corr., no. 2:05-cv-0986, 
2007 WL 593564, at *2–3 (S.D. ohio Feb. 21, 2007); Paris v. Union Pacific r.r. Co., 450 F. Supp. 2d 
913, 915 (E.D. ark. 2006); U.S. v. W.r. Grace, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1066–67 (D. Mont. 2005).
125. See In re Connelly, 240 n.Y.S.2d 126, 129 (1st Dep’t 1963).
126. See In re o’neil, 239 n.Y.S. 297, 298 (1st Dep’t 1930); In re Wilkes, 201 n.Y.S.2d 524, 525 (1st Dep’t 
1960); In re Chopak¸202 n.Y.S.2d 46, 46 (1st Dep’t. 1960).
127. See Juskowitz v. Hahn, 289 n.Y.S.2d 870, 871 (Sup. Ct. nassau County 1968).
128. See generally new York State Bar ass‘n, Prof ’l Ethics Comm., op. 47 (1967) (addressed whether a 
plaintiff ’s attorney may communicate with defendant’s insurance carrier); new York State Bar ass’n, 
Prof ’l Ethics Comm. op., 101 (1969) (addressed whether an attorney appointed a trustee in bankruptcy 
may communicate directly with the bankrupt); new York State Bar ass’n, Prof ’l Ethics Comm., op. 
101(a) (1969) (addressed whether an attorney trustee in a bankruptcy may serve the bankrupt with 
formal orders and notices).
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 Local new York bar associations, however, did apply Canon 9 to organizations. 
In a 1942 ethics opinion, the association of the Bar of the City of new York (“new 
York City Bar association”) examined whether attorneys may interview employees 
“as to the facts involved in the litigation.”129 The association authorized blanket 
permission to interview employees ex parte without specifying if permission turned 
on the type of employees interviewed.130 Henry Drinker, a legal ethicist who served 
as Chair of the aBa Committee on Professional Ethics, however, later claimed that 
the Canon “probably precludes interviews of managing employees of a corporation 
having authority to bind it.”131 In 1964, the new York County Bar association, 
reaching a different conclusion, stated in absolute terms that all current employees 
are off-limits regardless of “whether such employees are in ministerial categories or 
have the capacity to bind the corporate employer.”132 The opinion expressly excluded 
only former employees from the disciplinary rule.133
 not until 1970, when the new York appellate Divisions adopted the Disciplinary 
rules of the Model Code, did Dr 7-104 replace Canon 9.134 The appellate Divisions 
declined to adopt the Ethical Considerations, which was insignificant since Ethical 
Consideration 18 provided no guidance regarding organizational parties.135 new 
York State courts addressed the disciplinary rule, as with Canon 9, on few occasions 
prior to Niesig. Primarily invoking Dr 7-104 in disciplinary proceedings against 
attorneys accused of either giving advice to an adverse individual party or soliciting a 
settlement or information from a represented individual.136 Prior to Niesig, the 
question of who constituted a “party” in the organizational context did not arise in 
new York State courts.
 new York bar associations and federal courts did, however, address the 
organizational issue under Dr 7-104 on several occasions before Niesig, devising a 
number of often conflicting approaches while also potentially providing an early 
statement of the “alter-ego” test. In 1970, the new York State Bar association examined 
whether an attorney may communicate with an employee of a governmental entity, 
holding conclusorily that “all communications concerning [the] matter must . . . be 
129. Bar ass’n of the City of new York, op. 613 (1942).
130. See id.
131. Henry S. Drinker, Legal Ethics 201 (Columbia Univ. Press 1953).
132. new York County Bar. ass’n, op. 528 (1964).
133. See id.
134. See new York State Bar ass‘n Comm. on Standards of attorney Conduct, Proposed rules of Prof ’l 
Conduct (2008), available at ht tp://w w w.nysba.org/aM/Template.cfm?Section=For_
attorneys&TEMPLaTE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ConTEnTID=15184.
135. See Model Code of Prof’l responsibility EC 7-18 (1983).
136. See, e.g., In re LaCava, 385 n.Y.S.2d 642, 643 (4th Dep’t 1976) (communicated with and secured 
affidavit from individual party represented by counsel); In re Shapiro, 455 n.Y.S.2d 604, 604 (1st Dep’t 
1982) (communicated a settlement offer with a represented individual); In re Blum, 525 n.Y.S.2d 107, 
108–09 (4th Dep’t 1988) (communicated advice to an adverse party).
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made with the designated counsel.”137 In 1982, the new York City Bar association 
overturned its 1942 opinion.138 Examining the interests of both parties and the 
objectives of the no-contact rule, the association settled on the scope-of-employment 
test, which prohibits interviews with employees “whose conduct or statements with 
respect to matters within the scope of their employment could affect the corporation’s 
legal rights or obligations.”139 In contrast and without explanation, the nassau County 
Bar association had issued a blanket ban against interviewing employees ex parte 
shortly before Niesig.140
 In 1975, the Second Circuit became the first new York federal court to consider 
the matter. In Ceramco v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, the defendant sought to disqualify 
plaintiff ’s counsel for contacting an employee ex parte and asking questions to help 
determine venue.141 Interestingly, the circuit court did not focus on the identity or 
status of the employee contacted, but rather on the conduct of the attorney. Because the 
attorney did not overreach or deceive the employee, the Second Circuit found no 
violation. Six years later in Sobel v. Yeshiva University, a district court alternatively 
considered the identity and position of the employees, this time, mid-level managerial 
employees.142 The court permitted the interviews because the employees could not bind 
their employer. In this case, the definition of the term “bind” extended from the section 
of the Federal rules of Civil Procedure that designates officers, directors, and managing 
agents as “parties” to speak on behalf of an organization at a deposition.143 The court 
noted that “[t]he persons sought to be interviewed are those whose depositions could 
not routinely be compelled.” although the Sobel court did not acknowledge it, courts 
typically use the managing-agent test to determine which employees fall within any of 
the three categories for a deposition under the civil practice rules. The test is typically 
“answered pragmatically and on a fact-specific basis,” focusing on a number of factors.144 
In 1985, in Frey v. Department of Health and Humans Services, another federal district 
court addressed the merits of interviewing high- and low-level employees. This time 
the court determined that employees who “are the ‘alter-egos’ of the entity, that is, 
those individuals who can bind it to a decision or settle controversies on its behalf,” 
would be deemed parties.145 Holding that “the high level managerial employees who 
participated in the decision not to promote plaintiff fall within that category,” the court 
137. new York State Bar ass‘n, op. 160 (1970).
138. See new York State Bar ass’n, Prof ’l Ethics Comm., op. 80-46 (1980).
139. Id.
140. See nassau County Bar ass’n Comm. on Prof ’l Ethics, op. 2/89 (1989).
141. See 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1975).
142. See no. 75 Civ. 2232, 1981 WL 334, at *1 (S.D.n.Y. nov. 19, 1981).
143. See id.; see also Fed. r. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), 32(a)(3).
144. Schindler Elevator Corp. v. otis Elevator Co., no. 06 Civ. 5377, 2007 WL 1771509, *2 (S.D.n.Y. June 
18, 2007).
145. See Frey v. Dep’t of Health & Humans Servs., 106 F.r.D. 32, 35 (E.D.n.Y. 1985).
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sought to balance the interests of the parties when it came to lower-level employees.146 
Two years later, another new York federal district court employed this “alter-ego” test 
to low-level employees.147
 at the time of these latter two federal cases, the aBa had enacted Model rule 
4.2, but the new York federal courts did not address the provision and its corresponding 
Comment until 1990, shortly before Niesig. In Polycast Technology v. Uniroyal, Inc., the 
district court examined whether Dr 7-104 or rule 4.2 governed the dispute, since 
federal courts are not bound to follow the ethical directives of their host state.148 The 
court adopted the former directive, yet acknowledged that “[t]his does not mean, 
however, that this Court is bound by state court interpretations of the Code.”149 
accordingly, in holding that former employees were not parties, the court looked to 
Comment 4, in addition to policy considerations and out-of-state case law. Subsequent 
new York federal courts, however, have continued to use the case-by-case balancing-
of-interests test.150 Yet others courts have citied the Niesig and the Comment 4 tests 
simultaneously, as though they supplemented each another,151 even though Niesig flatly 
rejected the Comment 4 test.152 Finally, in 1990, the Court of appeals announced its 
three prong alter-ego test in Niesig. Consisting of a binding prong, an imputation 
prong, and advice of counsel prong, all premised on agency and evidence law, the alter-
ego test was a rejection of nearly every approach that preceded it since the new York 
City Bar association first gave permission for all interviews in 1942. nonetheless, the 
history of the no-contact rule in new York does not end here.
 For the longest time, new York State remained the only state to hang onto the 
Model Code, while others adopted the Model rules or some variation of it.153 Having 
considered adopting the Model rules in 1985, the new York State Bar association 
was eventually overruled by the nYSBa House of Delegates.154 Soon after the aBa’s 
2002 amendments to the Model rules, the new York State Bar association 
146. Id.
147. McKitty v. Bd. of Educ., no. 86 Civ. 3176, 1987 WL 28791, at *2 (S.D.n.Y. Dec. 16, 1987).
148. 129 F.r.D. 621, 625 (S.D.n.Y. 1990).
149. Id.
150. Lizotte v. new York City Health & Hosps. Corp., no. 85 Civ. 7548, 1990 WL 267421, at *3–6 
(S.D.n.Y. Mar. 13, 1990); Suggs v. Capital Cities/aBC, Inc., no. 86 Civ. 2774, 1990 WL 182314, at 
*3–6 (S.D.n.Y. apr. 24, 1990). For example, constitutional or discrimination claims will weigh heavily 
in plaintiff ’s favor.
151. See Pauling v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Interior, no 95 Civ. 8408, 1997 WL 661393, at *1 (S.D.n.Y. oct. 22, 
1997); Miano v. aC & r adver., Inc., 148 F.r.D. 68, 76–77 (S.D.n.Y. 1993).
152. See niesig v. Team I, 76 n.Y.2d 363, 375 (1990) (“[W]e make clear that the definition of ‘party’ we adopt 
for the purposes of Dr 7-104(a)(1) is not derived from the official Comment to aBa Model rule 4.2.”).
153. american Bar association, Dates of adoption of the Model rules of Professional Conduct, http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/chron_states.html (last visited oct. 22, 2009). 
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Committee on Standards of attorney Conduct (CoSaC) proposed the adoption of 
the rules.155 according to CoSaC, the revised Comment to rule 4.2 is “consistent 
with the decision of the Court of appeals in Niesig.”156 But this is merely the 
Committee’s opinion—the Committee provides no explanation or support to back up 
its conclusion. Both tests presumably intimate different standards. as previously noted, 
a federal court had already equated the term “obligate” with the speaking-authority 
test, which Niesig did not completely embrace by itself.157 rather, Niesig’s binding prong 
potentially casts a wider net, focusing on the authority to bind with conduct or words.
 regardless, in 2007, the nYSBa House of Delegates adopted CoSaC’s 
suggestions, and, in February 2008, the nYSBa submitted a resolution to the 
appellate Divisions requesting they adopt the rules.158 on December 16, 2008, the 
appellate Divisions ultimately approved the Model rules, authorizing them to take 
effect on april 1, 2009.159 The Divisions surprisingly did not adopt the Comment 
sections to the rules that the nYSBa had recommended.160 absent the Comments, 
the no-contact rule remains largely unchanged under rule 4.2. Unless the appellate 
Divisions adopt the Comments, the Court of appeals appears unlikely to disturb the 
alter-ego test. Since Niesig, the court has only revisited the test on one occasion. In 
2007, in Muriel Siebert Co. v. Intuit, Inc.—decided 17 years after Niesig—the high 
court affirmed that former employees are not parties.161 The Court of appeals’ 
reluctance to reevaluate the test, however, in no way precludes new York federal 
courts from revisiting their approach.
III. tHE COmpOSItION Of DISCIpLINARY RuLES
 Underlying the debate about what type of professional self-governing system to 
implement is the following question: what is the best way to compose ethical 
directives? Since the Canons, ethical directives have shifted from broader to narrower 
compositions. one motive for rejecting the Canons was that they “were not cast in 
155. See resolution adopted nov. 5, 2005 to Govern the Consideration of the report of the 
Committee on Standards of attorney Conduct, available at http://www.nysba.org/aM/
Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLaTE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ConTEnTID=2839.
156. Staff Memorandum from the new York State Bar ass’n Comm. on Standards of attorney Conduct 
House of Delegates 328 (Jan. 26, 2007), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/navigationMenu38/
CommitteeonStandardsofattorneyConductHome/CoSaC_January_2007_House_Meeting.pdf.
157. See Niesig, 76 n.Y.2d at 375 n.5. In footnote five, the court cites to a number of cases and bar associations 
that have promulgated a “similar test.” However, those tests are not as similar to the Niesig’s test as the 
Court of appeals might have wished. For example, in Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash.2d 192, 
200 (1984), the court adopted the speaking-agent test, which Niesig never fully adopted. also, in 
Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D. Kan. 1988) the court adopted the Comment 4 test.
158. See new York State Bar ass’n Proposed rules of Prof’l Conduct, supra note 154.
159. Press release, new York State Unified Court System, new attorney rules for Professional Conduct 
announced (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/press/pr2008_7.shtml.
160. See id. The new rules of Professional Conduct will replace the disciplinary rules of n.Y. Comp. Codes 
r. & regs. tit. 22, § 1200 (1990). Id.
161. 836 n.Y.S.2d 527 (2007).
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language designed for disciplinary enforcement.”162 Wolfram, for instance, noted that 
the “wording [was] too vague and general to afford guidance.”163 In a 1908 letter 
from Judge Francis C. Lowell of the First Circuit to Ezra Thayer, a member of the 
committee that prepared the Canons, Lowell criticized the proposed Canons’ 
language and form as improper for guiding professional conduct.164 He remarked:
The object of the Code is to provide rules of practice, not by way of a sermon 
with a homiletic purpose, but by way of ordinances which shall tell all lawyers 
what they may do professionally and what they are forbidden to do. The 
Code, as I understand it, like any other body of rules, is not intended primarily 
to foster indefinite aspirations for virtue, but to regulate the ordinary affairs 
of the professional life.”165
according to Judge Lowell, attorneys needed “accurate and concise” directives.166
 Later, as the aBa changed to the rules, the Commission on Evaluation of 
Professional Standards emphasized that the “value of standards of ethical conduct to 
the individual lawyer who seeks to practice in professionally responsible ways lies in 
their definiteness.”167 In scope, the “rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers 
and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies.”168 
Standards with “sweeping” language fail to provide attorneys with “fair limitation or 
fair warning.”169 as one federal district court noted in 1990, the “importance of 
providing attorneys with concrete ethical guidelines cannot be underestimated 
[because] [t]he disciplinary rules often carry the threat of possible sanctions against 
attorneys for ethical violations.”170 
 The very naming of the aBa’s major amendments has also signaled the move 
toward a more definite and clearer compositional structure of directives. The term 
“canon” denotes a moralistic, fundamental standard,171 while a “rule” is legalistic in 
nature without explicit regard for moral axioms. a rule principally concerns itself 
with what an actor may or may not do.172 a rule relies on punitive measures, executed 
162. Model Code of Prof’l responsibility Preface (1969).
163. Wolfram, supra note 21, at 55.
164. See Letter from Judge Francis C. Lowell to Ezra Thayer 1 (June 12, 1908) (on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library). 
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Kutak, supra note 78.
168. Model rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. and Scope (2007).
169. Kutak, supra note 78.
170. Siguel v. Trs. of Tufts College, no. 88-0626-Y, 1990 WL 29199, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 1990).
171. See oxford English Dictionary Vol. 11 838 (2d. Ed. 1989) (a Canon is “a general rule, fundamental 
principle, aphorism, or axiom governing the systematic or scientific treatment of a subject.”).
172. See Daly, supra note 21, at 1123 (“From the actors’ perspective, rules are usually perceived as more 
conduct-specific than standards.”).
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by an external adjudicating body, to ensure compliance, while a canon relies on the 
actor to reform independently. Circumventing a canon does not trigger punitive 
action, but relies on self-evaluation to instill a sense of ethical obligation and 
professionalism.173 as a result, the composition of a canon differs significantly from 
that of a rule. Ideally, the former has no compositional limits, while the latter 
necessitates specificity, namely, notice of required conduct.
 Wolfram has criticized the “unnecessary breadth” in ethical oversight for failing 
to notify attorneys explicitly what conduct will give rise to sanctions.174 at the core of 
his criticism, he appeals to the void for vagueness doctrine, which articulates that the 
“basic principle of due process” means that “an enactment is void . . . if its prohibitions 
are not clearly defined.”175 Justice Thurgood Marshall expounded upon the doctrine, 
asserting: “[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws 
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.”176 adjudicative bodies should 
not employ a rule that fails to give individuals notice of the proscribed conduct and 
then deprive the individuals of their livelihood, especially when the client’s interests 
compel an attorney to advocate zealously.
 Courts, however, have been reluctant to annul disciplinary directives as too 
vague. a disciplinary provision frequently scrutinized as open-ended is Dr 1-102(a)
(5), which states that a lawyer shall not “engage in any other conduct that adversely 
ref lects on his fitness to practice law.”177 Courts have upheld the directive on the 
basis that attorneys know or should know those actions that diminish their fitness.178 
according to the new York Court of appeals, the guiding principle in determining 
vague directives is “whether a reasonable attorney, familiar with the Code and its 
ethical strictures, would have notice of what conduct is proscribed.”179 a new York 
appellate court added that Dr 1-102(a)(5) “does not exist in a vacuum. It must be 
read in conjunction with the other Disciplinary rules and the ethical strictures of 
173. See id. Daly has noted that “[s]tandards are less determinative than rules because they serve to promote 
the advancement of abstract ideals such as goodness and fairness. From the decisionmaker’s perspective, 
standards are both a blessing and a burden; a blessing because they encourage and legitimize nuanced 
resolutions, a burden because they demand careful and honest ref lection.”). Id.
174. Wolfram, supra note 21, at 87 (“Unecessary breadth is to be regretted in professional rules that can be 
used to deprive a person of his or her means of livelihood through sanctions that are universally regarded 
as stigmatizing.”). Moreover, Wolfram has disapprovingly referred to certain directives as “garbage cans 
of the Code . . . into which anything can be tossed.” Id. at n.50.
175. Grayned v. City of rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
176. Id.
177. Model Code of Prof’l Conduct Dr 1-102(a)(6) (1969).
178. In re Holtzman, 78 n.Y.2d 184, 190–91 (1991); In re Cohen, 530 n.Y.S.2d 830, 832 (1st Dep’t 1988); 
In re Discipline of an attorney, 442 Mass. 660, 668–69 (Mass. 2004); In re Holley, 729 n.Y.S.2d 128, 
132 (1st Dep’t 2001).
179. In re Holtzman, 78 n.Y.2d at 191.
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the Code of Professional responsibility.”180 The trouble with the reasonable-attorney 
standard is that it requires a case-by-case factual analysis and attorneys to memorize 
the Code—an ineffective method for regulating professional conduct, particularly 
because it could lead to counter-productively cautious client advocacy.
 accordingly, when punitive sanctions attach to disciplinary directives, their 
semantic construction should be broadly, if not universally, operational. operational 
directives are ready-made; once the drafter sets down his or her pen, the directives 
should contain the necessary language to function in real-life situations. In other 
words, the author’s selected language should effectively communicate the proper 
scope of conduct across time, place, and circumstances. Directives are operational if 
they are instrumental, meaning that the language used is mechanistic and universally 
applicable—requiring no interpretation, only reference. The selected language, 
therefore, should be narrow, concise, and understandable to its audience. Standards 
such as the Canons, on the other hand, are too conceptual, inciting reflection and 
interpretation.181 They may be cast in broad language, otherwise ineffective for 
regulations with punitive consequences. If drafters fail to devise an operational 
directive, they leave the burden on the courts to implement the necessary 
instrumentalities, which are typically expressed in the form of tests. The resultant 
tests then should also function mechanistically.
 Interestingly, Hoffman stated that ethical directives should be “frame[ed] [] in 
the manner of resolutions, rather than of didactic rules, hoping they may thereby 
prove more impressive, and be the more likely to be remembered.”182 He specifically 
focused on the form of the directive rather than the specified conduct. nearly all of 
his resolutions begin with the pledge: “I will . . . .”183 The ensuing conduct of each 
pledge is broadly defined and moralizing in tone.184 For example, resolution 1 states: 
“I will never permit professional zeal to carry me beyond the limits of sobriety and 
decorum,” and resolution 2 states: “I will espouse no man’s cause out of envy, hatred 
or malice, towards his antagonist.”185
 Granted, Hoffman’s suggestion to frame ethical directives as resolutions only 
concentrated on the composition of the pledge, rather than conduct. Extending 
Hoffman’s compositional suggestion to the conduct of a directive rather than just to 
the pledge, however, informs how the conduct of contemporary ethical directives 
should be composed. Consider that resolutions serve to incorporate and bind parties 
to a resolved statement. Didactic rules, on the other hand, are aphoristic; they express 
a general truth or wise observation without a binding effect. Didactic rules resemble 
the early Canons, possessing a generalized meaning and moralistic tone that would 
180. In re Cohen, 530 n.Y.S.2d at 832.
181. Daly, supra note 21, at 1123.
182. Hoffman, supra note 58, at 751 (emphasis in original).
183. Id. at 752–75.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 752.
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require attorneys to engage in repeated, intensive reading, whereas resolutions would 
require attorneys to engage in more extensive reading, viz. the collection of resolved 
statements opposed to their dissection. Because a resolution serves to bind a collective 
to a specific course of conduct, it should ideally be narrowly devised. otherwise, 
members of the collective will more likely breach the parameters of the resolution.
 Disciplinary rule 7-104 was not composed properly because the term “party” in 
the organizational context is open to too many interpretations. The responsibility 
then falls to the courts to mend the problem and provide attorneys with advance 
notice of the appropriate limits of conduct. In order to do that, courts should forge a 
rule, interpretation, or test that effectively communicates a singular, comprehensible 
denotation of the term “party.” In Niesig, the Court of appeals, however, constructed 
an ineffective test that threatens attorneys’ ability to protect their livelihood and 
advocate zealously.
IV. tHE SHORtCOmINgS Of Niesig
 In Niesig, the plaintiff, a construction worker, was injured when he fell from a 
scaffold at a construction site.186 Following commencement of an action against his 
employer, the plaintiff sought judicial approval to conduct ex parte interview of low-
level employee witnesses present at the time of the accident.187 In fashioning the 
alter-ego test, the Court of appeals rejected the control-group test and blanket 
prohibition on such communications.188 The control-group test defined “party” to 
include only the most senior management exercising substantial control over the 
corporation, which left the majority of the workforce susceptible to informal 
interviews.189 at the other end of the spectrum, the blanket ban on such interviews, 
which the appellate Division had endorsed,190 classified all current employees as 
parties. While both of these extremes advance greater predictability in application, 
they each left one party at a disadvantage. attempting to strike a balance between 
both, the court settled on the middle-road, three-prong alter-ego test.
 Ironically, the Court of appeals predicted that the alter-ego test would “become 
relatively clear in application” because “[i]t is rooted in developed concepts of the law 
of evidence and the law of agency, thereby minimizing the uncertainty facing lawyers 
about to embark on employee interviews.”191 This prophecy, however, has not 
materialized. State and federal courts in new York State have barely, if ever, raised or 
utilized the commands of agency and evidence law in their analysis.192 The Niesig 
186. niesig v. Team I, 76 n.Y.2d 363, 368 (1990).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 371.
189. See id. at 373.
190. See id. at 372.
191. Id. at 375.
192. See, e.g., Miano v. aC & r adver., Inc., 148 F.r.D. 68 (S.D.n.Y. 1993) (holding an executive assistant 
was not a “party” under the no-contact rule because he did not hold a management level position and his 
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court in fact never administered the alter-ego test against the employees at issue, but 
conclusorily permitted the interviews based on their low status.193 Subsequent new 
York case law has almost exclusively addressed low-level and former employees, 
holding, with little explanation, that they are not “parties.”194 In fact, the conclusions 
insinuate that low-level employees are invariably unable to bind a principal, thus 
completely disregarding local agency and evidence laws.
 Mechum v. Outdoor World Corp195 and Gilbert v. State of New York,196 virtually the 
only cases to address whether a supervisor is a party, both illustrate the failure to 
utilize agency and evidence laws.197 In Mechum, the plaintiff, with the assistance of 
counsel, tape-recorded a conversation with a supervisor employed by the defendant.198 
The trial court noted that the plaintiff sought to gain an admission that “would have 
to come from one with authority to speak for or bind the corporation.”199 Without 
explanation, the court summarily found that while the employee was not senior 
management, “supervisors have significant managerial responsibility, sufficient to 
preclude ex parte communications.”200 While the summary conclusion suggests that 
supervisors should be deemed parties based solely on their status,201 no court has 
affirmatively adopted Mechum. In fact, just a year after the decision, in Gilbert, the 
trial court tacitly rejected the proposition of Mechum, but similarly failed to isolate 
statements could not be imputed to the corporation). In Gidatex v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 82 F.
Supp.2d 119 (S.D.n.Y. 1999), the court held that the sales clerks were not parties because they were 
“low-level employees with no management responsibilities whatsoever. as a result, they would generally 
not be considered parties under Dr 7-104(a) because they have no apparent or actual authority to bind 
the company.” Id. at 125. That is not necessarily accurate under agency law; while a low-level employee 
typically has little authority to bind, he or she is not without binding authority simply based on hierarchal 
status, just as a higher-level employee does not necessarily have power to bind a principal on that fact 
alone. In Merrill v. City of New York, no. 04 Civ. 1371, 2005 WL 2923520, at *1 (S.D.n.Y. nov. 4, 
2005), the court held that a police officer was not a party because he “was not in a position to bind the 
City, much less the other defendants in this case, in recounting what he observed at a police 
demonstration.” In Albany Med. Ctr. v. U.S., 04 Civ. 1399, 2006 WL 4573714, at *6 (n.D.n.Y. oct. 17, 
2006), the court held that former employees could be interviewed. In Pauling v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of 
Interior, no 95 Civ. 8408, 1997 WL 661393, at *2 (S.D.n.Y. oct. 22, 1997), the court held with little 
analysis that the employee was not a party. In Quintana v. City of New York, 686 n.Y.S.2d 408, 409 (2d 
Dep’t 1999), the court held that the superintendent was a low-level employee.
193. See niesig v. Team I, 76 n.Y.2d 363, 374–76 (1990).
194. See cases cited, supra note 13.
195. 654 n.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1996).
196. 662 n.Y.S.2d 989 (n.Y. Ct. Cl. 1997).
197. Schmidt v. State, 695 n.Y.S.2d 225 (n.Y. Ct. Cl. 1999), is a third case that addresses the identity of 
supervisors. The court held that the supervisor was a party because the supervisor’s conduct may impute 
liability onto the State. Id. at 229. The binding and imputation prongs differ in that the binding prong 
is based on an employee’s authority while the other is based on vicarious liability.
198. 654 n.Y.S.2d at 244.
199. Id. at 247.
200. Id.
201. Mechum addressed other issues associated with Dr 7-104, to which other courts have cited. See id. 
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how the principles of agency and evidence instructed its analysis of whether a 
supervisor was able to bind. There, the claimants sued the State for creating the icy 
road conditions that caused an automobile accident.202 During discovery, their 
attorney interviewed a state supervisor ex parte who witnessed the condition of the 
road and the State’s snow removal efforts.203 The State sought to exclude the 
supervisor’s statements under the no-contact rule, on the basis that the supervisor 
possessed significant powers to bind, such as authority to direct personnel, make 
field decisions, and file disciplinary complaints against employees.204 Even though 
the court explicitly stated that the issue rested on the employee’s ability to bind, it 
went ahead and employed the imputation prong, holding that the supervisor could 
not subject the State to liability because he was not responsible for the bypass on the 
day of the accident.205 The court left open whether or not the supervisor was 
considered “indistinguishable” from, or could speak for, the State solely based on his 
authority.
 With respect to the binding prong, the doctrines of agency and evidence are 
unable collectively to provide attorneys with prospective guidance as to whether or 
not employees have the power to bind their employer. Each doctrine presents 
complicated, fact intensive issues inappropriate for a mandatory disciplinary rule that 
requires clear and functional instrumentalities. aggravating matters, Niesig and its 
progeny fail to supplement one another to build a normative jurisprudence that would 
help guide attorneys and reduce judicial intervention.
 A. Binding under New York Agency Law
 Under new York law, employees may possess actual, implied, or apparent authority 
to bind their principal. actual authority is defined as “the power of the agent to do an 
act or to conduct a transaction on account of the principal which . . . he is privileged to 
do because of the principal’s manifestation to him.”206 Under implied authority, an 
agent is empowered to bind a principal “when verbal or other acts by a principal 
reasonably give the appearance of authority to the agent.”207 The problem with these 
two types of authority is obvious: an attorney is forced to investigate what a principal’s 
words or conduct could have been towards an alleged agent. Compounding the 
problem, an agent may also obtain apparent authority when a “third party relied upon 
the misrepresentations of [an] agent because of some misleading conduct on the part of 
202. See Gilbert v. State, 662 n.Y.S.2d 989, 990 (n.Y. Ct. Cl. 1997).
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 992–93.
206. Dinaco, Inc. v. Time Warner, Inc., 346 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2003); Wen Kroy realty Co. v. Pub. nat’l 
Bank & Trust Co., 260 n.Y. 84, 91 (1932) (“actual authority is the result of the principal’s consent 
manifested to the agent.”). 
207. 99 Commercial St. Inc. v. Goldberg, 811 F. Supp. 900, 906 (S.D.n.Y. 1993) (citing Greene v. Hellman, 
51 n.Y.2d 197, 204 (1980)).
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the principal.”208 apparent authority is created when “words or conduct of the 
principal, communicated to a third party, [] give rise to the appearance and belief 
that the agent possesses authority to enter into a transaction.”209 This requires an 
attorney to undertake the nearly insurmountable task of uncovering the tangled 
relationships between an agent, principal, and third party.
 Because every employee, regardless of hierarchal rank, may possess any one of 
these three types of authority to bind the principal at some point, the legal problem is 
exacerbated. This area of law is in fact often rife with litigation. Even more, a litigant 
cannot establish any one of the agency authorities formulaically, for example, by relying 
on titles alone. 210 Yet, neither the Court of appeals nor new York’s lower courts have 
attempted to more narrowly construe which of the three agency relationships should be 
utilized and which disregarded, followed by how they should be applied.
 B. Binding under New York Evidence Law
 The Court of appeals’ adoption of evidence law as a basis refers to the “speaking 
agent” exception.211 Under new York law, an agent’s statements are generally not 
binding upon his principal as an admission. The exception, however, maintains that 
an agent may bind a principal to statements as though the employer itself stated them 
when the statements are made (1) within the scope of the employee’s authority and 
(2) during the course of the employee’s performance of his duties.212 The central 
issue typically focuses on the first element, which asks whether the employer 
implicitly or explicitly authorized the employee to make statements. Explicit 
authorization is simple enough: an employer instructs an employee to speak to the 
media, for example. Implicit authorization primarily deals with the employee’s 
responsibilities, i.e., was it a part of the employee’s job responsibilities to speak on 
behalf of the entity?213 These types of employees typically consist of representatives 
208. Ford v Unity Hosp., 32 n.Y.2d 464, 473 (1973).
209. Hallock v. new York, 64 n.Y.2d 224, 231 (1984).
210. The new York Court of appeals and the State’s lower courts have held that an employee’s authority to 
bind, whether in the form of actual or another type of authority, shall not be based merely on the 
employee’s title. See, e.g., Wolf v. United Drug Co., 229 n.Y. 537, 538–39 (1920); Bruckner v. Hartford 
accident & Indem. Co., 657 n.Y.S.2d 514, 515 (3d Dep’t 1997); Studebaker Bros. Co. v. r.M. rose 
Co, 119 n.Y.S. 970, 972 (n.Y. City Ct. 1909).
211. See niesig v. Team I, 76 n.Y.2d 363, 374 (1990) (“The potential unfair advantage of extracting 
concessions and admissions from those who will bind the corporation is negated when employees with 
‘speaking authority’ for the corporation . . . are deemed ‘parties.’”).
212. See Giandana v. Providence rest nursing Home, 815 n.Y.S.2d 526, 531 (1st Dep’t 2006); Kelly v. 
Diesel Constr. Div., 35 n.Y.2d 1, 8 (1974); niesig v. Team I, 545 n.Y.S.2d 153, 157 (2d Dep’t 1989).
213. See Prado v. onor oscar, Inc., 353 n.Y.S.2d 789, 790 (2d Dep’t 1974); Jordan v. Excel Moving & 
Storage, 800 n.Y.S.2d 348, 348 (n.Y. Civ. Ct. Kings County 2005) (due to the nature of job 
responsibilities, the general manager was in a position “to speak on behalf of the company with respect 
to the company’s general procedures.”).
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who act in a spokesperson capacity,214 such as a company communications officer, 
chief executive officer, public relations officer, or chair of the board.
 new York’s exception ironically favors the control-group test because normally 
high-level management employees are those empowered to speak for the entity.215 
But the exception is not that simple. For example, under the exception, a supervisory 
title alone will not automatically satisfy the element.216 Mid-level supervisors may 
have no authority to speak on behalf of the entity, while low-level communications 
supervisors may.
 The appellate court in Niesig actually denounced the exception as a test because 
it would likely expose all employees to ex parte interviews,217 the complaint similarly 
lodged against the control-group test. First, the appellate court observed that 
corporate litigants represented by counsel would be unlikely, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to authorize an employee to engage in ex parte interviews.218 Second, the 
court was unable to fathom how ex parte interviews of employees “could ever be 
viewed as having been made in the course of that employee’s actual duties,”219 though 
a press relations officer or a chief executive officer might prove the rare exception. of 
course, the difference between the appellate court and the high court is that the 
latter was not considering the exception as a test, but rather as a basis to satisfy its 
alter-ego test, which raises multiple rhetorical questions: how should courts and 
litigants use the evidentiary exception? are bases employed differently than tests? 
are litigants expected to satisfy both elements in the same way they would if faced 
with an evidentiary question? Did Niesig instead seek to employ the spirit of the 
exception, meaning that those employees typically authorized to speak for the 
employer would be deemed parties? The court’s endorsement of evidence, and agency 
law for that matter, does not fully provide the answers.
 C. Agency and Evidence Law in the Disciplinary Context 
 agency and evidence law predominately require a fact specific inquiry into the 
relationships of persons. Without any clarification, if attorneys want to interview an 
employee, these two doctrines require them to conduct discovery into and litigate 
214. See, e.g., Spett v. President Monroe Bldg. & Mfg. Corp.¸  19 n.Y.2d 203, 206–07 (1967) (statement made 
by “general foreman” shortly after plaintiff ’s accident was admissible because the foreman “whom 
complete management responsibility for the enterprise was vest[ed,]” essentially, served as the company’s 
“spokesman.”).
215. See id.
216. The vicarious admission issue frequently arises in premises liability actions where plaintiffs attempt to 
impute knowledge via employee statements. See, e.g., Cohn v. Mayfair Supermarkets, Inc., 759 n.Y.S.2d 
131, 132 (2d Dep’t 2003) (no evidence store manager authorized to speak on behalf of the employer); 
alvarez v. First nat’l Supermarkets, Inc., 783 n.Y.S.2d 62, 64 (2d Dep’t 2004) (same); Berzon v. 
D’agostino Supermarkets, Inc., 792 n.Y.S.2d 94, 95 (2d Dep’t 2005) (same).
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whether or not the employer has empowered the employee to act or speak for the 
entity. attorneys should not be expected to engage in the sort of analysis with which 
courts frequently struggle. Courts should explicitly identify how to apply bases, 
particularly those as conceptual as agency and evidence bases, in the disciplinary 
context. The courts’ failure to do so threatens to leave attorneys hopelessly mired in 
agency and evidence law.
 another concern is that under agency and evidence law, an agent’s ability to bind 
a principal to a course of conduct or statement rests on whether authority is prescribed; 
it generates an either-or analysis. The problem then is that employers may empower 
employees to act or speak for the company in limited or broad circumstances, which 
prevents drawing a clear line along the organizational hierarchy. In his lone 
concurrence in Niesig, Judge Joseph Bellacosa worried that the alter-ego test would 
swallow any exceptions, claiming it would “function almost identically with the 
rejected [blanket ban] test.”220 one reason presumably is that all employees could 
effectively fall within the binding-prong enclave. For that reason, the term “bind” 
should be defined by the type of authority possessed, establishing a ceiling beyond 
which attorneys could not pass.
 In that regard, as Judge Bellacosa added, the “purpose [of the no-contact rule is] 
quite distinct from enactments in public law prescribing the rights and protections of 
parties to litigation.”221 He was pointing out that a test should satisfy the purposes 
for which a rule was enacted. agency and evidence law encompass a vast market of 
public behavior suitable for respondent superior in tort law, for example, but unsuitable 
for the disciplinary arena, which covers a specific population and sphere of conduct. 
Historically, the no-contact rule was designed to protect parties from overreaching 
attorneys extracting undue concessions, admissions, settlements, and privileged 
communications that, in the organizational context, only those at the helm of an 
entity, who truly are “indistinguishable” from it, typically have the power to make. a 
test should then be narrowly tailored to identify those employees and, in doing so, it 
will fulfill the rule’s purposes. The national Labor relations act “supervisor” test 
should help do just that because its purpose is to define those employees who are 
deemed one and the same as the entity.
V. tHE NAtIONAL LABOR RELAtIONS ACt “SupERVISOR” tESt
 In 1935, Congress passed the national Labor relations act (nLra), informally 
known as the Wagner act, which sought to protect employees’ right to organize and 
to reduce industrial unrest.222 The act forbids employers from interfering with, 
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights related to organizing, 
forming, or joining a labor organization for collective-bargaining purposes.223
220. niesig v. Team I, 76 n.Y.2d 363, 376 (1990) (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 377.
222. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
223. Id. at § 158(a) (2006).
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 Initially, the act did not expressly exclude supervisors from its protections. Under 
the act, “the term ‘employee’ shall include any employee . . . but shall not include 
any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any 
family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse,” an 
exceptionally expansive (and circular) definition.224 Shortly after its enactment, the 
unionization of supervisors became a fiercely contested issue. In 1942, the national 
Labor relations Board (“Board”) affirmatively held in a sequence of cases that 
supervisors constituted “employees” and were entitled to the act’s protections.225 The 
Board reasoned that since supervisors were not included in the three enumerated 
exclusions, Congress must have intended the act to cover persons employed as 
supervisors.226 a year later, the Board backtracked in Maryland Drydock Co., appearing 
to overrule its prior position.227 The Board quickly clarified itself in Packard Motor 
Car Co., however, maintaining that supervisors were deemed employees, but that the 
Board had discretion to deny them protections when it served the purposes of the 
act.228 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Packard Motor Car Co. decision, 
solidifying supervisors’ nLra protections.229
 The Court’s decision, however, received stinging criticism. It left the nLra 
without a clear distinction between “employees” and “employers.” In his Packard dissent, 
Justice William Douglas stated: “The present decision . . . tends to obliterate the line 
between management and labor” and “tends to emphasize that the basic opposing 
forces in industry are not management and labor but the operating group . . . and the 
stockholder.”230
 In response, Congress enacted the Labor relations act in 1947, also referred to as 
the Taft-Harley act, which amended the nLra, reversing the Court’s Packard 
decision. The amended nLra explicitly defined supervisors and excluded those so 
defined from the protections of the act. Under the act, a supervisor includes any:
[I]ndividual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, 
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other 
employees, or responsibly direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or 
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the 
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but 
requires the use of independent judgment.231
224. Id. at § 152 (2006).
225. See Union Collieries Coal Co., 44 n.L.r.B. 165, 167 (1942); Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 n.L.r.B. 874, 
879 (1942).
226. See Union Collieries, 44 n.L.r.B. at 167–68.
227. See 49 n.L.r.B. 733, 737 (1943).
228. See 61 n.L.r.B. 4, 5–7 (1945).
229. See Packard Motor Car Co. v. nat’l Labor relations Bd., 330 U.S. 485, 491–92 (1947).
230. Id. at 494 (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
231. 29 U.S.C.§ 152(11) (2006). In Nat’ l Labor Relations Bd. v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., the U.S. 
Supreme Court established the supervisory test to identity which employees are deemed statutory
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 Because the statute is disjunctive, an employee need only possess authority to 
execute one of the thirteen enumerated functions.232
 although an alleged supervisor possesses a listed authority, the statute still requires 
courts and litigants to focus on the quantity and quality of authority. “In determining 
whether someone is a supervisor,” the Fifth Circuit has stated, “job titles [will] reveal 
very little, if anything.”233 an employee must have power to exercise independent 
judgment in performing the supervisory functions; otherwise the employee cannot be 
deemed a supervisor.234 In other words, supervisors must have “real power” to act in the 
interests of their employer.235 according to the Board, in order to exercise such power, 
“an individual must at minimum act, or effectively recommend action, free of the 
control of others and form an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing 
data.”236 Employees who exercise independent judgment do not need to obtain approval 
or permission from higher-ranked employees or follow the commands of superiors; 
instead, they alone make employment decisions regarding the organization’s needs.237 
authority that is customary, sporadic, nominal, or “dictated or controlled by detailed 
instructions,” will likely fall below the required threshold.238
 Employees who have the autonomous power to hire and terminate other employees 
are likely the easiest employees to label as a “supervisor” under the nLra. Some 
supervisors will, however, fall along an indeterminate position on the chain of 
command, possessing certain degrees of power. The most common areas that the 
case law examines are an alleged supervisor’s power to direct, assign, or discipline.
 A. Power to Responsibly Direct
 The power to responsibly direct focuses on two issues: first, supervisors’ power to 
oversee how work is performed and, second, the potential repercussions they face for 
performance issues. The first component is straightforward. It looks at whether the 
 supervisors. The Court instructed litigants to address three questions: 1) does the employee have the 
authority to exercise at least one of the thirteen listed powers; 2) if so, does the employee exercise a listed 
power using independent judgment; and 3) does the employee exercise the power in the interest of the 
employer. 511 U.S. 571, 573–74 (1994).
232. See Superior Bakery, Inc. v. nat’l Labor relations Bd., 893 F.2d 493, 496 (2d. Cir. 1990); nat’l Labor 
relations Bd. v. Sec. Guard Serv., Inc., 384 F.2d 143, 147 (5th Cir. 1967).
233. nat’l Labor relations Bd. v. aDCo Elec. Inc., 6. F.3d 1110, 1117 (5th Cir. 1993).
234. See Sec. Guard Serv., Inc., 384 F.2d at 147 (emphasis added).
235. Id. at 148.
236. oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 n.L.r.B. 686, 693 (2006).
237. See Superior Bakery, 893 F.2d at 496–97; nat’l Labor relations Bd. v. Metro. Petrol. Co., 506 F.2d 616, 
617–18 (1st Cir. 1974). 
238. Oakwood Healthcare, 348 n.L.r.B. at 708; see also Sec. Guard Serv., 384 F.2d.at 147 (quoting S. rep. no. 
105, at 4 (1947) (The definition of supervisor is “distinguished between straw bosses, leadmen, set-up 
men, and other minor supervisory employees, on the one hand, and the supervisor vested with such 
genuine management prerogatives as to the right to hire or f ire, discipline, or make effective 
recommendations with respect to such action.”)).
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alleged supervisor has the power to instruct and correct how work is performed.239 If 
alleged supervisors follow preset policies, work orders, or some other type of 
instructions, their power will likely be deemed routine or clerical, not independent.240 
The same goes for alleged supervisors who direct employees that “generally perform 
the same job or repetitive tasks on a regular basis and, once trained in their positions, 
require minimal guidance.”241 Moreover, simply being the highest-ranking employee 
on site will not automatically create de facto directing power.242
 The responsibility component asks whether the alleged supervisor is “answerable 
for the discharge of a duty or obligation.”243 Employees are deemed answerable when 
they are “held fully accountable and responsible for the performance and work 
product of the employees” they direct.244 accountability is established with proof 
that “there is a prospect of adverse consequences for the putative supervisor if he/she 
does not take [corrective] steps.”245 Being held accountable aligns the employee with 
the employer; the employee’s decisions are made in the employer’s interests, not those 
of the employees.246
 The question simply boils down to whether the alleged supervisor is on the hook 
for work problems. Evidence that employees are subject to discipline or unsatisfactory 
evaluations for the performance of others is typically proof of accountability.247 For 
example, an employer issues a written warning to an alleged supervisor because his 
subordinates fail to meet production goals.248 Material, adverse consequences, 
however, should accompany evaluations or warnings; they are usually insufficient by 
themselves.249
 B. Power to Assign
 The power to assign refers to employees’ authority to make immediate, autonomous 
workforce decisions in connection with employers’ business needs. The focus is on 
239. See Croft Metals, Inc., 348 n.L.r.B. 717, 721 (2006).
240. See id. 
241. Id. at 722.
242. See Training School at Vineland and Commc’ns Workers of am., 332 n.L.r.B. 1412, 1412 (2000) 
(citing list of cases).
243. Oakwood Healthcare, 348 n.L.r.B. at 691 (quoting nat’l Labor relations Bd. v. KDFW-TV, Inc., 790 
F.2d 1273, 1278 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
244. Spentonbush/red Star Cos. v. nat’l Labor relations Bd., 106 F.3d 484, 490–91 (2d Cir. 1997) (court 
lists a number of legal and policy duties the employee will face consequences for if violated); nat’l Labor 
relations Bd. v. Quinnipiac College, 256 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 2001) (shift supervisors reprimanded for 
action of other employees and required to control certain situations).
245. Oakwood Healthcare, 348 n.L.r.B. at 692.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 695.
248. See Croft Metals, Inc. 348 n.L.r.B. 717, 722 (2006).
249. See Beverly Enterprises-Minnesota, Inc. 348 n.L.r.B. 727, 730 (2006).
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what, where, and when work is performed, not on how it is performed.250 The Board 
has defined “assign” as “the act of designating an employee to a place (such as a 
location, department, or wing), appointing an employee to a time (such as a shift or 
overtime period), or giving significant overall duties. i.e., tasks, to an employee.”251
 If employees are empowered to assign, they must still have significant discretion 
to do so; their decisions may not be predetermined by the employer’s orders.252 
Employers who expressly command their “supervisory” employees or institute 
instructive policies and procedures keep the independent decision-making power in 
their hands.253 The Board has even stated that business decisions based on “preexisting 
priorities—[like] a customer out of [a product]—or commonsense considerations—
[like] a sick driver must be replaced” are equally excluded from independence.254 
Furthermore, an assignment that results from an employee’s knowledge and skills 
regarding issues incidental to performing job duties rather than the employee’s role as 
an agent may not suffice.255 If the assignment is solely based on “equalizing 
workloads,” it too may be deemed routine and clerical.256 Finally, assigning workers 
for overtime to meet routine overtime demands is also typically insufficient. Circuit 
courts have warned, however, that established policies and procedures do not 
automatically strip an employee of discretion.257 Employers may still empower alleged 
supervisors to use significant discretion in making assignment decisions, despite 
established policies.
 C. Power to Discipline
 The power to discipline asks whether an employee has authority to effectuate 
consequences for a subordinate. There are a number of instances where alleged 
250. See Oakwood Healthcare, 348 n.L.r.B. at 689 (“[C]hoosing the order in which the employee will perform 
discrete tasks within those assignments . . . would not be indicative of exercising the authority to ‘assign.’”).
251. Id.
252. See nat’l Labor relations Bd. v. Monroe Tube Co., 545 F.2d 1320, 1324–25 (2d Cir. 1976); see also nat’l 
Labor relations Bd. v. J.W. Mays, Inc., 675 F.2d 442, 444 (2d. Cir. 1982) (employees “collect[ed] 
information so that others can make decisions, and routinely direct[ed] nontitled guards to do the jobs 
others [had] assigned them.”); nat’l Labor relations Bd. v. Meenan oil Co, 139 F.3d 311, 321 (2d Cir. 
1998) (the dispatchers “decisionmaking is directed and circumscribed by clearly established Company 
policy, and they exercise no authority that transcends the routine or clerical, or that requires the use of 
independent judgment.”); Schnurmacher nursing Home v. nat’l Labor relations Bd., 214 F.3d 260, 
266 (2d Cir. 2000) (nurse’s exercise of nominal discretion too little to establish assigning authority).
253. Meenan Oil Co, 139 F.3d at 321–22 (company established policies and procedures to instruct dispatcher 
how to direct employees).
254. See B.P. oil, Inc., 256 n.L.r.B. 1107, 1109 (1981).
255. See nat’l Labor relations Bd. v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 8 Fed. app’x 111, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing nat’l 
Labor relations Bd. v. aDCo Elec. Inc., 6. F.3d 1110, 1117 (5th Cir. 1993)).
256. Oakwood Healthcare, 348 n.L.r.B. at 693.
257. See nat’l Labor relations Bd. v. Quinnipiac College, 256 F.3d 68, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2001) (including 
itself, provides examples of cases).
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supervisors may appear to engage in disciplinary activities, but lack real authority. 
Many employees may not make any judgments regarding a subordinate’s conduct, 
but merely act as a “conduit for information” for the employer to take necessary 
action.258 For example, employees who informally counsel subordinates are not 
necessarily labeled supervisors.259 Employees unable to discipline other employees 
without consulting higher management will not automatically create such status 
either.260 Executing performance evaluations also does not necessarily fall within the 
ambit of authority to discipline. an evaluation or other types of discipline that affects 
a subordinate’s job status, such as termination, demotion, or promotion, should signal 
that the employee is a supervisor.261
 D. The Supervisor Test as the Basis for niesig’s Binding Prong 
 The nLra supervisor test is consistent with the goals of Niesig because it focuses 
on the relationship between the employee and employer by identifying those 
employees closely linked with the latter. at the same time, the supervisor test should 
enhance the functionality of the binding prong, which the doctrines of agency and 
evidence struggle to do. The major advantage of the supervisor test is that the 
statutory language preempts the analysis by limiting it onto the thirteen enumerated 
powers. This should have the effect of designating a clearer line along the 
organizational hierarchy absent from the analysis under the current binding prong. If 
an employee does not possess any of the thirteen powers, he or she is automatically 
not a supervisor and thus should be available for ex parte interviews. Those employees 
that do possess any of the enumerated powers are not necessarily untouchable. The 
power must still consist of substantial quality and quantity. Because the focus is 
solely on the enumerated powers—many of which may be relatively familiar and 
recognizable to plaintiffs and their counsel, such as the power to hire and terminate—
attorneys do not have to go searching for every possible authorization bestowed upon 
an employee. The breadth of case law on the nLra supervisor test also should provide 
attorneys with considerable guidance. as a result, the test should improve attorneys’ 
ability to prospectively identify which employees are able to “bind” the entity.
258. Meenan Oil Co, 139 F.3d at 321.
259. Quinnipiac College, 256 F.3d at 75 (employees who may informally counsel subordinates deemed 
supervisors because they also had the authority to recommend discipline sanctions.). In Schnurmacher 
Nursing Home v. Nat’ l Labor Relations Bd., nurses counseled and disciplined staff members informally 
and occasionally referred such issues to higher management, but the court did not deem such actions 
and referrals as disciplinary authority. 214 F.3d 260, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2000).
260. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 8 Fed. app’x at 114.
261. See new York Univ. Med. Ctr. v. nat’l Labor relations Bd., 156 F.3d 405, 414 (2d Cir.1998) (unit chiefs 
required to evaluate attending physicians were instructed to give a grade range not deemed supervisors 
on that basis.); Schnurmacher, 214 F.3d at 265 (nurses’ written evaluations of subordinates had no effect 
on job status of subordinates).
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VI.  pROCEDuRAL AND EVIDENtIARY REquIREmENtS fOR CONDuCtINg OR 
pRECLuDINg ex Parte INtERVIEWS
 A.  Procedural Requirements
 The Comment to Model rule 4.2 advises: “a lawyer who is uncertain whether a 
communication with a represented person is permissible may seek a court order.”262 
This procedure disadvantages parties seeking interviews. It compels them to expend 
time and expense requesting judicial approval, places on them the initial burden of 
proof, and forces them to disclose their strategy, giving opposing counsel ample time 
to confer with the witness, all of which further supports the need for improved 
determinacy.
 Despite the Comment, courts have not adopted an official, uniform procedure 
for requesting or prohibiting ex parte interviews. Parties have pursued a number of 
tactics. Employers have moved for protective orders to prevent plaintiff ’s counsel 
from contacting their employees outside formal discovery methods.263 They have also 
moved to exclude statements obtained through ex parte interviews and to disqualify 
plaintiffs’ counsel for improper interviews.264 Plaintiffs’ attorneys have moved for 
declaratory orders and to “compel the defendants to desist from interfering with [] 
counsel’s efforts to communicate ex parte.”265 Two separate procedures may, however, 
better balance the interests of all parties and establish uniformity: 1) undisclosed 
contact, or 2) disclosed contact. While both procedures are devised with the 
supervisor test and fact witnesses in mind, they can also be adapted to the other two 
Niesig prongs.
  1. Undisclosed Contact
 attorneys may contact employees ex parte without notifying the employer and 
pose initial introductory questions to ensure compliance with the no-contact rule. at 
first, the attorney should question whether the employee has any of the thirteen 
functions of authority listed in the nLra supervisor test. If so, the attorney should 
then vet the quantity and quality of the authority guided by common sense and case 
law. For fact-witness employees, this type of questioning should not compel the 
release of any information that the no-contact rule protects. This procedure allows 
attorneys to gain information, while keeping their strategy hidden from defendants 
and preserving time and expense from litigating the no-contact issue.
 The method, however, presents obvious risks for disciplinary repercussions. 
attorneys might reach incorrect conclusions. or employees might accidentally or 
262. Model rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2002).
263. See, e.g., Frey v. Dep’t of Health & Humans Servs., 106 F.r.D. 32, 33 (E.D.n.Y. 1985); Wright v. Stern, 
no. 01 Civ. 4437, 2003 WL 23095571, at *1 (S.D.n.Y. Dec. 30, 2003).
264. See, e.g., Muriel Siebert & Co. v. Intuit, Inc., 8 n.Y.3d 506, 507–08 (2007).
265. See, e.g., McKitty v. Bd. of Educ., no. 86 Civ. 3176, 1987 WL 28791, at *1 (S.D.n.Y. Dec. 16, 1987).
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intentionally disclose protected information.266 Finally, attorneys might not resist 
eliciting information from a potential wellspring of facts that sits before them when 
they know the employee is likely a party.
  2. Disclosed Contact
 If attorneys are unsure whether an employee is a party, or are simply extra 
cautious, they should provide opposing counsel with a five-day notice of their 
intention to interview employees ex parte, which is not inconsistent with the deposition 
and subpoena notice requirement under the Federal rules of Civil Procedure.267 
Upon receipt of a notice, opposing counsel may seek a protective order within a 
limited five-day timeframe.268 If declining to object, opposing counsel’s silence 
should be deemed constructive consent, which would then protect attorneys from 
disciplinary repercussions.
 The procedural benefit is twofold. First, the burden shifts to employers to object 
and offer prima facie evidence that the employee is a party (which is where the burden 
should rest). Employers who seek unjustified protective orders solely to impede their 
adversary’s prosecution may be liable for sanctions. Second, the brief window to 
object ideally reduces the time employers have to taint the testimony of a witness. 
Unfortunately, revealing legal strategy might be somewhat unavoidable with any 
middle-road approach.
 B. Evidentiary Burdens
 Should an employer object to an ex parte interview, the employer should be 
required to proffer sufficient proof that the employee is a party, since a party seeking 
266. See, e.g., G-1 Holdings v. Baron & Budd, 199 F.r.D. 529, 535 (S.D.n.Y. 2001) (“It is unrealistic to 
expect even the best-intentioned lay person to be able to safeguard the attorney-client privilege.”).
267. See Fed. r. Civ. P. 30(b)(1); Fed. r. Civ. P. 45; see also P.S. v. Farm, Inc. 2009 WL 483236, at *4 
(D.Kan. Feb. 24, 2009) (five days notice deemed reasonable); CIF Licensing, LLC v. agere Systems 
Inc. 2009 WL 187823, at *2 (D.Del. Jan. 23, 2009) (seven days notice deemed reasonable); Jones v. U.S. 
720 F.Supp. 355, 366 (S.D.n.Y. 1989) (eight days notice deemed reasonable). Some courts recognize 
that service and notice of a subpoena may be performed simultaneously. See, e.g., Florida Media, Inc. v. 
World Publications, LLC, 236 F.r.D. 693, 694–95 (M.D.Fla. 2006); Shell v. Hilliard, 2007 WL 
509263, at *4  (E.D.Tenn. Feb. 13, 2007).
268. Courts have adopted procedures, which are similar to the disclosure procedure discussed here and are 
instructive. See, e.g., Katt v. new York City Police Dep’t, no. 95 Civ. 8283, 1997 WL 394593, at *5 
(S.D.n.Y. July 14, 1997) (the court instructed plaintiff to “serve a proposed list of the individuals she 
intends to interview, which should include the proposed employee’s name and job title. Within ten (10) 
days of the plaintiff ’s service of the list, defendants may serve and file their objections, if any, to the 
employees plaintiff proposes. . . . [T]he Court, if the parties are unable to agree in writing, will direct 
which employees may be interviewed.”); Wright, 2003 WL 23095571, at *1 (court directed plaintiff ’s 
counsel to advise defense counsel in writing of the names and positions (if known) of the employees at 
least seven days before the interviews); Kingsway Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, LLP, 
no. 03 Civ. 5560, 2006 WL 1520227, at *1 (S.D.n.Y. June 1, 2006) (party instructed to submit a list to 
opposing counsel, who has ten days to submit an affidavit or declaration attesting that the witnesses had 
access to privileged information).
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to restrict discovery of relevant material has the burden of persuasion.269 Since titles 
alone are insufficient to deny a party the right to interview an employee ex parte, a 
company cannot brand an employee with a decorative title of “supervisor” or 
“manager” in an effort to transform the employee into a “party” under the no-contact 
rule. Employers should produce admissible evidence, such as affidavits and documents 
that show their employee has the power to bind. Courts should reject broad, 
conclusory statements of authority—the nLrB has held as much in connection with 
the supervisor test.270 additionally, courts may not rely solely on the self-serving 
representations of an employer’s counsel regarding an employee’s authority. Both 
state and federal courts in new York have held that absent personal knowledge, 
counsel’s representations are not probative, and therefore, not admissible evidence.271
VII. CONCLuSION 
 The nLra supervisor test’s enumerated functions, at a minimum, should set a 
f loor below which all employee fact-witnesses may be available for ex parte interviews, 
something that agency and evidence law has failed to do. Both doctrines are too fact 
intensive and difficult to effectively limit in the attorney disciplinary context. The 
supervisor test, on the other hand, narrows the inquiry into specific forms of 
authority, some of which are common sense. In many instances, plaintiffs should 
know, for example, how to identify those employees with real power to hire, 
terminate, or discipline. an established floor will ideally improve attorneys’ ability to 
prospectively determine when fact witnesses are parties, which in turn will 
simultaneously allow them to prosecute actions zealously and protect their 
livelihood.
 The nLra supervisor test will not, however, magically resolve all the problems 
with the binding prong—nothing short of a blanket ban or possibly the control-
group test would. no doubt, attorneys would, in specific instances, still have to 
expend time and expense litigating the issue, but that is a valid consequence of any 
approach that attempts to resolve competing interests. The best courts can do in this 
situation is to implement the clearest possible standard, which is vital for mandatory 
disciplinary directives.
 While judicial intervention may initially be necessary to identify the relevant 
evidence an employer must present to establish the employee’s status as a party, the 
development of a functional body of law would reduce the need for excessive 
intervention. Employers will invariably know that empty, conclusory objections are 
269. See Murray v. Palmer, no. 903 Civ. 1010, 2006 WL 2516485, at *1 (n.D.n.Y. aug. 29, 2006).
270. Beverly Enterprises-Minnesota, Inc. 348 n.L.r.B. 727, 731 (2006) (“The Board has long recognized 
that purely conclusory evidence is not sufficient to establish supervisory status; instead, the Board 
requires evidence that the employee actually possesses the Section 2(11) authority at issue.”).
271. See Pisani v. Westchester County Health Care Corp., no. 05 Civ. 7113, 2007 WL 107747, at *2–3 
(S.D.n.Y. Jan. 16, 2007) (without an affidavit from an affiant with personal knowledge, counsel’s 
statements were deemed insufficient); Zuckerman v. City of new York, 49 n.Y.2d 557, 563 (1980) (“[T]he 
bare affirmation of royfost’s attorney who demonstrated no personal knowledge of the manner in 
which the accident occurred . . . is without evidentiary value.”).
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inadequate responses to notices to interview, but instead will know that probative 
evidence is required to establish an employee’s authority. once the evidentiary line is 
drawn, employers could not reasonably object to proper ex parte interviews (particularly 
at the risk of sanctions), and attorneys should refrain from seeking improper 
interviews. Moreover, because the courts are not constrained to use the test in 
accordance with congressional intent or federal jurisprudence, they may amend it to 
best suit the needs of the no-contact rule, such as making the supervisory functions 
conjunctive opposed to disjunctive, adhering to circuit courts’ narrow interpretation 
of “independent judgment,” or reducing the number of functions a “supervisor” may 
possess.
 The new York Court of appeals and its lower courts should continually explore 
revising the approach until the middle-road becomes as functional as possible. a 
disciplinary rule that invokes sanctions on those it governs warrants clarity from its 
rule-making and adjudicating branches to be useful. In the end, the latter branch is 
responsible for mending any deficiencies that the former branch leaves. adopting the 
nLra supervisor test as the determinant of propriety in ex parte interviews of 
employee fact-witnesses would greatly advance that goal.
